

## Calendar No. 245

119TH CONGRESS  
1ST SESSION**S. 2960**

To develop economic tools to deter aggression by the People's Republic of  
China against Taiwan.

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## IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER 1, 2025

Mr. RISCH (for himself, Mrs. SHAHEEN, Mr. COONS, and Mr. RICKETTS) in-  
troduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Com-  
mittee on Foreign Relations

OCTOBER 30, 2025

Reported by Mr. RISCH with an amendment

[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic]

**A BILL**

To develop economic tools to deter aggression by the People's  
Republic of China against Taiwan.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Deter PRC Aggression  
5 Against Taiwan Act”.

1 **SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

2 It is the sense of Congress that the United States  
3 must be prepared to take immediate action to impose  
4 sanctions with respect to any military or non-military enti-  
5 ties owned, controlled, or acting at the direction of the  
6 Government of the PRC or the Chinese Communist Party  
7 that are supporting actions by the Government of the PRC  
8 or by the Chinese Communist Party—

9 (1) to overthrow or dismantle the governing in-  
10 stitutions in Taiwan;

11 (2) to occupy any territory controlled or admin-  
12 istered by Taiwan;

13 (3) to violate the territorial integrity of Taiwan;

14 or

15 (4) to take significant action against Taiwan,  
16 including—

17 (A) conducting a naval blockade of Tai-  
18 wan;

19 (B) seizing any outlying island of Taiwan;

20 or

21 (C) perpetrating a significant physical or  
22 cyber attack on Taiwan that erodes the ability  
23 of the governing institutions in Taiwan to oper-  
24 ate or provide essential services to the citizens  
25 of Taiwan.

1 **SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.**

2 In this Act:

3 (1) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

6 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of  
7 the Senate;

8 (B) the Committee on Banking, Housing,  
9 and Urban Affairs of the Senate;

10 (C) the Committee on Commerce, Science,  
11 and Transportation of the Senate;

12 (D) the Committee on Finance of the Sen-  
13 ate;

14 (E) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of  
15 the House of Representatives;

16 (F) the Committee on Financial Services  
17 of the House of Representatives;

18 (G) the Committee on Energy and Com-  
19 merce of the House of Representatives; and

20 (H) the Committee on Ways and Means of  
21 the House of Representatives.

22 (2) **PRC.**—The term “PRC” means the Peo-  
23 ple’s Republic of China.

24 (3) **PRC SANCTIONS TASK FORCE; TASK**  
25 **FORCE.**—The terms “PRC Sanctions Task Force”

1 and “Task Force” mean the task force established  
2 pursuant to section 4.

3 **SEC. 4. PRC SANCTIONS TASK FORCE.**

4 (a) **ESTABLISHMENT.**—Not later than 180 days after  
5 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Coordinator for  
6 Sanctions of the Department of State and the Director  
7 of the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department  
8 of the Treasury, in coordination with the Director of Na-  
9 tional Intelligence and the heads of other Federal agen-  
10 cies, as appropriate, shall establish an interagency task  
11 force to identify military and non-military entities that  
12 could be subject to sanctions or other economic actions  
13 imposed by the United States immediately following any  
14 action taken by the PRC that demonstrates an attempt  
15 to achieve, or has the significant effect of achieving, the  
16 physical or political control of Taiwan, including by taking  
17 any of the actions described in paragraphs (1) through  
18 (4) of section 2.

19 (b) **STRATEGY.**—Not later than 180 days after the  
20 establishment of the PRC Sanctions Task Force, the Task  
21 Force shall provide a briefing to the appropriate congres-  
22 sional committees for identifying proposed targets for  
23 sanctions or other economic actions referred to in sub-  
24 section (a), which shall—

1           (1) assess how existing sanctions programs  
2 could be used to impose sanctions with respect to en-  
3 tities identified by the Task Force;

4           (2) develop or propose, as appropriate, new  
5 sanctions authorities that might be required to im-  
6 pose sanctions with respect to such entities;

7           (3) analyze the potential economic consequences  
8 to the United States, and to allies and partners of  
9 the United States, of imposing various types of such  
10 sanctions with respect to such entities;

11           (4) assess measures that could be taken to miti-  
12 gate the consequences referred to in paragraph (3),  
13 including through the use of licenses, exemptions,  
14 carve-outs, and other approaches;

15           (5) include coordination with allies and partners  
16 of the United States—

17           (A) to leverage sanctions and other eco-  
18 nomic tools including actions targeting the  
19 PRC's financial and industrial sectors to deter  
20 or respond to aggression against Taiwan;

21           (B) to identify and resolve potential im-  
22 pediments to coordinating sanctions-related ef-  
23 forts or other economic actions with respect to  
24 responding to or deterring aggression against  
25 Taiwan;

1           (C) to identify industries, sectors, or goods  
2           and services where the United States and allies  
3           and partners of the United States can take co-  
4           ordinated action through sanctions or other eco-  
5           nomic tools that will have a significant negative  
6           impact on the economy of the PRC; and

7           (D) to coordinate actions with partners  
8           and allies to provide economic support to Tai-  
9           wan and other countries being threatened by  
10          the PRC, including measures to counter eco-  
11          nomic coercion by the PRC;

12          (6) assess the resource gaps and needs at the  
13          Department of State, the Department of the Treas-  
14          ury, the Department of Commerce, the United  
15          States Trade Representative, and other Federal  
16          agencies, as appropriate, to most effectively use  
17          sanctions and other economic tools to respond to the  
18          threats posed by the PRC;

19          (7) recommend how best to target sanctions  
20          and other economic tools against individuals, enti-  
21          ties, and economic sectors in the PRC, which shall  
22          take into account—

23                 (A) the role of such targets in supporting  
24                 policies and activities of the Government of the  
25                 PRC, or of the Chinese Communist Party, that

1           pose a threat to the national security or foreign  
2           policy interests of the United States;

3           (B) the negative economic implications of  
4           such sanctions and tools for the Government of  
5           the PRC, including its ability to achieve its ob-  
6           jectives with respect to Taiwan; and

7           (C) the potential impact of such sanctions  
8           and tools on the stability of the global financial  
9           system, including with respect to—

10                   (i) state-owned enterprises;

11                   (ii) officials of the Government of the  
12                   PRC and of the Chinese Communist Party;

13                   (iii) financial institutions associated  
14                   with the Government of the PRC; and

15                   (iv) companies in the PRC that are  
16                   not formally designated by the Government  
17                   of the PRC as state-owned enterprises; and

18           (8) identify any foreign military or non-military  
19           entities that would likely be used to achieve the out-  
20           comes specified in section 2, including entities in the  
21           shipping, logistics, energy (including oil and gas),  
22           maritime, aviation, ground transportation, and tech-  
23           nology sectors.

1 **SEC. 5. ANNUAL REPORT.**

2 Not later than 180 days after the briefing required  
3 under section 4(b), and annually thereafter, the PRC  
4 Sanctions Task Force shall submit a classified report to  
5 the appropriate congressional committees that includes in-  
6 formation regarding—

7 (1) any entities identified pursuant to section  
8 4(b)(8);

9 (2) any new authorities required to impose  
10 sanctions with respect to such entities;

11 (3) potential economic impacts on the PRC, the  
12 United States, and allies and partners of the United  
13 States resulting from the imposition of sanctions  
14 with respect to such entities;

15 (4) mitigation measures that could be employed  
16 to limit any deleterious economic impacts on the  
17 United States and allies and partners of the United  
18 States of such sanctions;

19 (5) the status of coordination with allies and  
20 partners of the United States regarding sanctions  
21 and other economic tools identified under this Act;

22 (6) resource gaps and recommendations to en-  
23 able the Department of State and the Department  
24 of the Treasury to use sanctions to more effectively  
25 respond to the malign activities of the Government  
26 of the PRC; and

1           (7) any additional resources that may be nec-  
2           essary to carry out the strategies and recommenda-  
3           tions included in the report submitted pursuant to  
4           section 4(b).

5 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

6           *This Act may be cited as the “Deter PRC Aggression*  
7 *Against Taiwan Act”.*

8 **SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

9           (a) *SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING PREPAREDNESS*  
10 *TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS IN THE EVENT OF A TAIWAN CON-*  
11 *TINGENCY.—It is the sense of Congress that the United*  
12 *States must be prepared to take immediate action to impose*  
13 *sanctions with respect to any military or non-military enti-*  
14 *ties owned, controlled, or acting at the direction of the Gov-*  
15 *ernment of the PRC or the Chinese Communist Party that*  
16 *are supporting actions by the Government of the PRC or*  
17 *by the Chinese Communist Party—*

18           (1) *to overthrow or dismantle the governing in-*  
19 *stitutions in Taiwan;*

20           (2) *to occupy any territory controlled or admin-*  
21 *istered by Taiwan;*

22           (3) *to violate the territorial integrity of Taiwan;*

23           *or*

24           (4) *to take significant action against Taiwan,*  
25 *including—*

1                   (A) conducting a naval blockade of Taiwan;

2                   (B) seizing any outlying island of Taiwan;

3                   or

4                   (C) perpetrating a significant physical or  
5                   cyber attack on Taiwan that erodes the ability of  
6                   the governing institutions in Taiwan to operate  
7                   or provide essential services to the citizens of  
8                   Taiwan.

9                   (b) *SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES*  
10 *POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE*  
11 *PRC.—It is the sense of Congress that—*

12                   (1) *planning and recommendations developed by*  
13 *the PRC Sanctions Task Force pursuant to section 4*  
14 *are intended to compliment other United States re-*  
15 *sponses to PRC aggression and not contravene long-*  
16 *standing United States policy on Taiwan;*

17                   (2) *The United States remains committed to its*  
18 *“One China” policy, guided by the Taiwan Relations*  
19 *Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), the three United States-*  
20 *People’s Republic of China Joint Communiqués, and*  
21 *the Six Assurances;*

22                   (3) *any attempt by the People’s Republic of*  
23 *China to resolve Taiwan’s status through force, coer-*  
24 *cion, or other non-peaceful means is contrary to*  
25 *United States policy and national interests; and*

1           (4) *the future of Taiwan should be determined*  
2           *peacefully, free from the use of military force or any*  
3           *other forms of military, economic, or other forms of*  
4           *coercion from the People’s Republic of China, and in*  
5           *a manner that is acceptable to the people of Taiwan.*

6 **SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.**

7           *In this Act:*

8           (1) *APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-*  
9           *TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional commit-*  
10          *tees” means—*

11                   (A) *the Committee on Foreign Relations of*  
12                   *the Senate;*

13                   (B) *the Committee on Banking, Housing,*  
14                   *and Urban Affairs of the Senate;*

15                   (C) *the Committee on Commerce, Science,*  
16                   *and Transportation of the Senate;*

17                   (D) *the Committee on Finance of the Sen-*  
18                   *ate;*

19                   (E) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the*  
20                   *House of Representatives;*

21                   (F) *the Committee on Financial Services of*  
22                   *the House of Representatives;*

23                   (G) *the Committee on Energy and Com-*  
24                   *merce of the House of Representatives; and*

1                   (H) *the Committee on Ways and Means of*  
2                   *the House of Representatives.*

3                   (2) *PRC.—The term “PRC” means the People’s*  
4                   *Republic of China.*

5                   (3) *PRC SANCTIONS TASK FORCE; TASK*  
6                   *FORCE.—The terms “PRC Sanctions Task Force” and*  
7                   *“Task Force” mean the task force established pursu-*  
8                   *ant to section 4.*

9   **SEC. 4. PRC SANCTIONS TASK FORCE.**

10               (a) *ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 180 days after*  
11               *the date of the enactment of this Act, the Coordinator for*  
12               *Sanctions of the Department of State and the Director of*  
13               *the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of*  
14               *the Treasury, in coordination with the Director of National*  
15               *Intelligence and the heads of other Federal agencies, as ap-*  
16               *propriate, shall establish an interagency task force to iden-*  
17               *tify military and non-military entities that could be subject*  
18               *to sanctions or other economic actions imposed by the*  
19               *United States immediately following any action taken by*  
20               *the PRC that demonstrates an attempt to achieve, or has*  
21               *the significant effect of achieving, the physical or political*  
22               *control of Taiwan, including by taking any of the actions*  
23               *described in paragraphs (1) through (4) of section 2.*

24               (b) *STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days after the es-*  
25               *tablishment of the PRC Sanctions Task Force, the Task*

1 *Force shall provide a briefing to the appropriate congress-*  
2 *sional committees for identifying proposed targets for sanc-*  
3 *tions or other economic actions referred to in subsection (a),*  
4 *which shall—*

5           (1) *assess how existing sanctions programs could*  
6 *be used to impose sanctions with respect to entities*  
7 *identified by the Task Force;*

8           (2) *develop or propose, as appropriate, new sanc-*  
9 *tions authorities that might be required to impose*  
10 *sanctions with respect to such entities;*

11           (3) *analyze the potential economic consequences*  
12 *to the United States, and to allies and partners of the*  
13 *United States, of imposing various types of such*  
14 *sanctions with respect to such entities;*

15           (4) *assess measures that could be taken to miti-*  
16 *gate the consequences referred to in paragraph (3), in-*  
17 *cluding through the use of licenses, exemptions, carve-*  
18 *outs, and other approaches;*

19           (5) *include coordination with allies and partners*  
20 *of the United States—*

21           (A) *to leverage sanctions and other eco-*  
22 *nomics tools including actions targeting the*  
23 *PRC's financial and industrial sectors to deter*  
24 *or respond to aggression against Taiwan;*

1           (B) to identify and resolve potential im-  
2 pediments to coordinating sanctions-related ef-  
3 forts or other economic actions with respect to re-  
4 sponding to or deterring aggression against Tai-  
5 wan; and

6           (C) to identify industries, sectors, or goods  
7 and services where the United States and allies  
8 and partners of the United States can take co-  
9 ordinated action through sanctions or other eco-  
10 nomic tools that will have a significant negative  
11 impact on the economy of the PRC; and

12           (D) to coordinate actions with partners and  
13 allies to provide economic support to Taiwan  
14 and other countries being threatened by the PRC,  
15 including measures to counter economic coercion  
16 by the PRC;

17           (6) assess the resource gaps and needs at the De-  
18 partment of State, the Department of the Treasury,  
19 the Department of Commerce, the United States  
20 Trade Representative, and other Federal agencies, as  
21 appropriate, to most effectively use sanctions and  
22 other economic tools to respond to the threats posed by  
23 the PRC;

24           (7) recommend how best to target sanctions and  
25 other economic tools against individuals, entities, and

1 *economic sectors in the PRC, which shall take into ac-*  
2 *count—*

3 *(A) the role of such targets in supporting*  
4 *policies and activities of the Government of the*  
5 *PRC, or of the Chinese Communist Party, that*  
6 *pose a threat to the national security or foreign*  
7 *policy interests of the United States;*

8 *(B) the negative economic implications of*  
9 *such sanctions and tools for the Government of*  
10 *the PRC, including its ability to achieve its ob-*  
11 *jectives with respect to Taiwan; and*

12 *(C) the potential impact of such sanctions*  
13 *and tools on the stability of the global financial*  
14 *system, including with respect to—*

15 *(i) state-owned enterprises;*

16 *(ii) officials of the Government of the*  
17 *PRC and of the Chinese Communist Party;*

18 *(iii) financial institutions associated*  
19 *with the Government of the PRC; and*

20 *(iv) companies in the PRC that are*  
21 *not formally designated by the Government*  
22 *of the PRC as state-owned enterprises; and*

23 *(8) identify any foreign military or non-mili-*  
24 *tary entities that would likely be used to achieve the*  
25 *outcomes specified in section 2, including entities in*

1        *the shipping, logistics, energy (including oil and gas),*  
2        *maritime, aviation, ground transportation, and tech-*  
3        *nology sectors.*

4        **SEC. 5. ANNUAL REPORT.**

5        *Not later than 180 days after the briefing required*  
6        *under section 4(b), and annually thereafter, the PRC Sanc-*  
7        *tions Task Force shall submit a classified report to the ap-*  
8        *propriate congressional committees that includes informa-*  
9        *tion regarding—*

10            *(1) any entities identified pursuant to section*  
11            *4(b)(8);*

12            *(2) any new authorities required to impose sanc-*  
13            *tions with respect to such entities;*

14            *(3) potential economic impacts on the PRC, the*  
15            *United States, and allies and partners of the United*  
16            *States resulting from the imposition of sanctions with*  
17            *respect to such entities;*

18            *(4) mitigation measures that could be employed*  
19            *to limit any deleterious economic impacts on the*  
20            *United States and allies and partners of the United*  
21            *States of such sanctions;*

22            *(5) the status of coordination with allies and*  
23            *partners of the United States regarding sanctions and*  
24            *other economic tools identified under this Act;*

1           (6) *resource gaps and recommendations to enable*  
2           *the Department of State and the Department of the*  
3           *Treasury to use sanctions to more effectively respond*  
4           *to the malign activities of the Government of the*  
5           *PRC; and*

6           (7) *any additional resources that may be nec-*  
7           *essary to carry out the strategies and recommenda-*  
8           *tions included in the report submitted pursuant to*  
9           *section 4(b).*

10 **SEC. 6. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.**

11           (a) *RULE OF CONSTRUCTION REGARDING CONTINUED*  
12 *UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN AND THE GOV-*  
13 *ERNMENT OF THE PRC.—Nothing in this Act may be con-*  
14 *strued as a change to the One China Policy of the United*  
15 *States, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act (22*  
16 *U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), the three United States-People’s Re-*  
17 *public of China Joint Communiqués, and the Six Assur-*  
18 *ances.*

19           (b) *RULE OF CONSTRUCTION REGARDING SANCTIONS*  
20 *AUTHORITIES IDENTIFIED OR RECOMMENDED BY THE*  
21 *TASK FORCE.—None of the sanctions identified or rec-*  
22 *ommended pursuant to this Act are self-executing. Any such*  
23 *sanctions may only be imposed on an entity if they are*  
24 *explicitly authorized under—*

1           (1) *a Federal law that was in effect on the day*  
2           *before the date of the enactment of this Act; or*

3           (2) *an Act of Congress that is enacted after the*  
4           *date of the enactment of this Act.*



Calendar No. 245

119<sup>TH</sup> CONGRESS  
1<sup>ST</sup> Session

**S. 2960**

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**A BILL**

To develop economic tools to deter aggression by the People's Republic of China against Taiwan.

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OCTOBER 30, 2025

Reported with an amendment