

119TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. 2960

To develop economic tools to deter aggression by the People's Republic of
China against Taiwan.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER 1, 2025

Mr. RISCH introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred
to the Committee on Foreign Relations

A BILL

To develop economic tools to deter aggression by the People's
Republic of China against Taiwan.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Deter PRC Aggression
5 Against Taiwan Act”.

6 **SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

7 It is the sense of Congress that the United States
8 must be prepared to take immediate action to impose
9 sanctions with respect to any military or non-military enti-
10 ties owned, controlled, or acting at the direction of the

1 Government of the PRC or the Chinese Communist Party
2 that are supporting actions by the Government of the PRC
3 or by the Chinese Communist Party—

4 (1) to overthrow or dismantle the governing in-
5 stitutions in Taiwan;

6 (2) to occupy any territory controlled or admin-
7 istered by Taiwan;

8 (3) to violate the territorial integrity of Taiwan;

9 or

10 (4) to take significant action against Taiwan,
11 including—

12 (A) conducting a naval blockade of Tai-
13 wan;

14 (B) seizing any outlying island of Taiwan;

15 or

16 (C) perpetrating a significant physical or
17 cyber attack on Taiwan that erodes the ability
18 of the governing institutions in Taiwan to oper-
19 ate or provide essential services to the citizens
20 of Taiwan.

21 **SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.**

22 In this Act:

23 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
24 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
25 mittees” means—

1 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
2 the Senate;

3 (B) the Committee on Banking, Housing,
4 and Urban Affairs of the Senate;

5 (C) the Committee on Commerce, Science,
6 and Transportation of the Senate;

7 (D) the Committee on Finance of the Sen-
8 ate;

9 (E) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
10 the House of Representatives;

11 (F) the Committee on Financial Services
12 of the House of Representatives;

13 (G) the Committee on Energy and Com-
14 merce of the House of Representatives; and

15 (H) the Committee on Ways and Means of
16 the House of Representatives.

17 (2) PRC.—The term “PRC” means the Peo-
18 ple’s Republic of China.

19 (3) PRC SANCTIONS TASK FORCE; TASK
20 FORCE.—The terms “PRC Sanctions Task Force”
21 and “Task Force” mean the task force established
22 pursuant to section 4.

23 **SEC. 4. PRC SANCTIONS TASK FORCE.**

24 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 180 days after
25 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Coordinator for

1 Sanctions of the Department of State and the Director
2 of the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department
3 of the Treasury, in coordination with the Director of Na-
4 tional Intelligence and the heads of other Federal agen-
5 cies, as appropriate, shall establish an interagency task
6 force to identify military and non-military entities that
7 could be subject to sanctions or other economic actions
8 imposed by the United States immediately following any
9 action taken by the PRC that demonstrates an attempt
10 to achieve, or has the significant effect of achieving, the
11 physical or political control of Taiwan, including by taking
12 any of the actions described in paragraphs (1) through
13 (4) of section 2.

14 (b) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days after the
15 establishment of the PRC Sanctions Task Force, the Task
16 Force shall provide a briefing to the appropriate congres-
17 sional committees for identifying proposed targets for
18 sanctions or other economic actions referred to in sub-
19 section (a), which shall—

20 (1) assess how existing sanctions programs
21 could be used to impose sanctions with respect to en-
22 tities identified by the Task Force;

23 (2) develop or propose, as appropriate, new
24 sanctions authorities that might be required to im-
25 pose sanctions with respect to such entities;

1 (3) analyze the potential economic consequences
2 to the United States, and to allies and partners of
3 the United States, of imposing various types of such
4 sanctions with respect to such entities;

5 (4) assess measures that could be taken to miti-
6 gate the consequences referred to in paragraph (3),
7 including through the use of licenses, exemptions,
8 carve-outs, and other approaches;

9 (5) include coordination with allies and partners
10 of the United States—

11 (A) to leverage sanctions and other eco-
12 nomic tools including actions targeting the
13 PRC's financial and industrial sectors to deter
14 or respond to aggression against Taiwan;

15 (B) to identify and resolve potential im-
16 pediments to coordinating sanctions-related ef-
17 forts or other economic actions with respect to
18 responding to or deterring aggression against
19 Taiwan;

20 (C) to identify industries, sectors, or goods
21 and services where the United States and allies
22 and partners of the United States can take co-
23 ordinated action through sanctions or other eco-
24 nomic tools that will have a significant negative
25 impact on the economy of the PRC; and

1 (D) to coordinate actions with partners
2 and allies to provide economic support to Tai-
3 wan and other countries being threatened by
4 the PRC, including measures to counter eco-
5 nomic coercion by the PRC;

6 (6) assess the resource gaps and needs at the
7 Department of State, the Department of the Treas-
8 ury, the Department of Commerce, the United
9 States Trade Representative, and other Federal
10 agencies, as appropriate, to most effectively use
11 sanctions and other economic tools to respond to the
12 threats posed by the PRC;

13 (7) recommend how best to target sanctions
14 and other economic tools against individuals, enti-
15 ties, and economic sectors in the PRC, which shall
16 take into account—

17 (A) the role of such targets in supporting
18 policies and activities of the Government of the
19 PRC, or of the Chinese Communist Party, that
20 pose a threat to the national security or foreign
21 policy interests of the United States;

22 (B) the negative economic implications of
23 such sanctions and tools for the Government of
24 the PRC, including its ability to achieve its ob-
25 jectives with respect to Taiwan; and

1 (C) the potential impact of such sanctions
2 and tools on the stability of the global financial
3 system, including with respect to—
4 (i) state-owned enterprises;
5 (ii) officials of the Government of the
6 PRC and of the Chinese Communist Party;
7 (iii) financial institutions associated
8 with the Government of the PRC; and
9 (iv) companies in the PRC that are
10 not formally designated by the Government
11 of the PRC as state-owned enterprises; and
12 (8) identify any foreign military or non-military
13 entities that would likely be used to achieve the out-
14 comes specified in section 2, including entities in the
15 shipping, logistics, energy (including oil and gas),
16 maritime, aviation, ground transportation, and tech-
17 nology sectors.

18 **SEC. 5. ANNUAL REPORT.**

19 Not later than 180 days after the briefing required
20 under section 4(b), and annually thereafter, the PRC
21 Sanctions Task Force shall submit a classified report to
22 the appropriate congressional committees that includes in-
23 formation regarding—

24 (1) any entities identified pursuant to section
25 4(b)(8);

1 (2) any new authorities required to impose
2 sanctions with respect to such entities;

3 (3) potential economic impacts on the PRC, the
4 United States, and allies and partners of the United
5 States resulting from the imposition of sanctions
6 with respect to such entities;

7 (4) mitigation measures that could be employed
8 to limit any deleterious economic impacts on the
9 United States and allies and partners of the United
10 States of such sanctions;

11 (5) the status of coordination with allies and
12 partners of the United States regarding sanctions
13 and other economic tools identified under this Act;

14 (6) resource gaps and recommendations to en-
15 able the Department of State and the Department
16 of the Treasury to use sanctions to more effectively
17 respond to the malign activities of the Government
18 of the PRC; and

19 (7) any additional resources that may be nec-
20 essary to carry out the strategies and recommenda-
21 tions included in the report submitted pursuant to
22 section 4(b).

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