

119TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. 2912

To prohibit deceptive practices in Federal elections.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

SEPTEMBER 18 (legislative day, SEPTEMBER 16), 2025

Ms. ALSOBROOKS (for herself, Mr. SCHIFF, Mr. BLUMENTHAL, Mr. PADILLA, Ms. HIRONO, Mr. VAN HOLLEN, Ms. CANTWELL, Mr. MERKLEY, and Mrs. GILLIBRAND) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL

To prohibit deceptive practices in Federal elections.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Deceptive Practices
5 and Voter Intimidation Prevention Act of 2025”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress makes the following findings:

8 (1) The right to vote by casting a ballot for
9 one’s preferred candidate is a fundamental right ac-
10 corded to United States citizens by the Constitution,

1 and the unimpeded exercise of this right is essential
2 to the functioning of our democracy.

3 (2) Historically, certain citizens, especially ra-
4 cial, ethnic, and language minorities, were prevented
5 from voting because of significant barriers such as
6 literacy tests, poll taxes, and property ownership re-
7 quirements.

8 (3) Some of these barriers were removed by the
9 15th, 19th, and 24th Amendments to the Constitu-
10 tion.

11 (4) Despite the elimination of some of these
12 barriers to the polls, the integrity of today's elec-
13 tions is threatened by newer tactics aimed at sup-
14 pressing voter turnout. These tactics include "decep-
15 tive practices", which involve the dissemination of
16 false or misleading information intended to prevent
17 voters from casting their ballots, prevent voters from
18 voting for the candidate of their choice, intimidate
19 the electorate, and undermine the integrity of the
20 electoral process.

21 (5) Furthermore, since the decision in Shelby
22 County v. Holder in which the Supreme Court
23 struck down the coverage formula used by the Vot-
24 ing Rights Act of 1965 to determine which States
25 with a history of racial discrimination must affirma-

1 tively receive government permission before changing
2 local voting laws, there have been Federal court de-
3 cisions finding or affirming that States or localities
4 intentionally discriminated against African Ameri-
5 cans and other voters of color.

6 (6) Denials of the right to vote, and deceptive
7 practices designed to prevent members of racial, eth-
8 nic, and language minorities from exercising that
9 right, are an outgrowth of discriminatory history, in-
10 cluding slavery. Measures to combat denials of that
11 right are a legitimate exercise of congressional power
12 under article I, section 4 and article II, section 1 of,
13 and the 14th and 15th Amendments to, the United
14 States Constitution.

15 (7) For the last few decades, there have been
16 a number of instances of deceptive or intimidating
17 practices aimed towards suppressing minority access
18 to the voting booth that demonstrates the need for
19 strengthened protections.

20 (8) In addition, in at least one instance in
21 1990, thousands of voters reportedly received post-
22 cards providing false information about voter eligi-
23 bility and warnings about criminal penalties for
24 voter fraud. Most of the voters who received the
25 postcards were African American.

1 (9) During the 2004 elections, Native American
2 voters in South Dakota reported being required to
3 provide photographic identification in order to vote,
4 despite the fact that neither State nor Federal law
5 required such identification.

6 (10) In the 2006 midterm elections, thousands
7 of Latino voters received mailings warning them in
8 Spanish that voting in a Federal election as an im-
9 migrant could result in incarceration—despite the
10 fact that any immigrant who is a naturalized citizen
11 of the United States has the same right to vote as
12 any other citizen.

13 (11) In 2008, fliers were distributed in pre-
14 dominantly African American neighborhoods falsely
15 warning that people with outstanding warrants or
16 unpaid parking tickets could be arrested if they
17 showed up at the polls on election day. In the same
18 year, there were reports of people receiving text mes-
19 sages on election day asking them to wait until the
20 following day to vote.

21 (12) In 2012, there were reports of voters re-
22 ceiving calls falsely informing them that they could
23 vote via telephone.

24 (13) On January 6, 2017, the Office of the Di-
25 rector of National Intelligence published a report ti-

1 tled “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in
2 Recent U.S. Elections”, noting that “Russian Presi-
3 dent Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign
4 in 2016 aimed at the U.S. Presidential election.”.
5 Moscow’s influence campaign followed a Russian
6 messaging strategy that blends covert intelligence
7 operation—such as cyber activity—with overt efforts
8 by Russian Government agencies, State-funded
9 media, third-party intermediaries, and paid social
10 media users or “trolls”. These influence operations
11 included messaging that targeted African American
12 voters with misinformation.

13 (14) On April 18, 2019, Special Counsel Robert
14 Mueller released a report titled “Report on the In-
15 vestigation into Russian Interference in the 2016
16 Presidential Election”, which concluded that “the
17 Russian government interfered in the 2016 presi-
18 dential election in sweeping and systematic fash-
19 ion.”. The report details that Russia interfered in
20 the 2016 Presidential election principally through
21 two operations: first, through a Russian government
22 sponsored social media influence campaign, and sec-
23 ond, by Russian intelligence “computer-intrusion”
24 operations against those associated with both Presi-
25 dential campaigns. The Mueller Report details how

1 Russian agents intentionally targeted Black social
2 justice groups and created fake accounts purporting
3 to represent Black social justice groups in order to
4 spread disinformation and sow division.

5 (15) Social media makes the mass dissemina-
6 tion of misleading information easy and allows per-
7 petrators to target particular audiences with preci-
8 sion. One analysis documented hundreds of messages
9 on Facebook and Twitter designed to discourage or
10 prevent people from voting in the 2018 election. In
11 2016, these false statements were extremely preva-
12 lent with both domestic and foreign actors. Russian
13 operatives engaged in a concerted disinformation
14 and propaganda campaign over the internet that
15 aimed, in part, to suppress voter turnout, especially
16 among Black voters. These efforts by the Russian
17 Government continued and became more aggressive
18 in the 2020 election cycle.

19 (16) In 2023, Douglass Mackey was convicted
20 for his role in the conspiracy to interfere with poten-
21 tial voters' right to vote in the 2016 Presidential
22 election, in violation of section 241 of title 18,
23 United States Code. The Department of Justice al-
24 leged that Mackey conspired with other influential
25 Twitter users and with members of private online

1 groups to use social media platforms, including
2 Twitter, to disseminate fraudulent messages that en-
3 couraged supporters of Presidential candidate Hil-
4 lary Clinton to “vote” via text message or social
5 media. However, in 2025, the U.S. Court of Appeals
6 for the Second Circuit reversed Mackey’s conviction
7 on the ground that prosecutors had not proven that
8 his deceptive conduct was part of a conspiracy. This
9 ruling underscores the need for Congress to update
10 the law to more effectively protect against voter sup-
11 pression through deceptive practices, regardless of
12 whether it is accomplished through a conspiracy or
13 by one bad actor alone.

14 (17) During the 2020 Presidential election,
15 Texas voters received robocalls stating that the
16 Democratic primary would be taking place after its
17 actual date. In the same year, communities of color
18 in Michigan, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, and New
19 York were targeted by robocalls sharing false infor-
20 mation about how their data would be shared if they
21 voted by mail. Widespread disinformation was tar-
22 geted at Latino communities in Florida and other
23 States, particularly through social media.

24 (18) During the 2020 Presidential election, vot-
25 ers in some precincts faced voter intimidation during

1 early voting and on election day. The Election Pro-
2 tection hotline received nearly 32,000 calls on elec-
3 tion day. Reports from the Voting Rights Defender
4 and Prepared to Vote project teams and the NAACP
5 Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., showed
6 that minority voters were disproportionately im-
7 pacted by voter intimidation. Incidents included
8 3,000,000 robocalls telling people to stay home on
9 election day and armed people at polling sites on
10 election day in Florida, North Carolina, and Lou-
11 isiana. Additionally, election officials, volunteers, and
12 electors faced unprecedented intimidation including
13 doxxing, death threats, and other intimidating com-
14 munication.

15 (19) Those responsible for these and similar ef-
16 forts should be held accountable, and civil and crimi-
17 nal penalties should be available to punish anyone
18 who seeks to keep voters away from the polls by pro-
19 viding false information.

20 (20) Moreover, the Federal Government should
21 help correct such false information in order to assist
22 voters in exercising their right to vote without confu-
23 sion and to preserve the integrity of the electoral
24 process.

1 (21) The Federal Government has a compelling
 2 interest in “protecting voters from confusion and
 3 undue influence” and in “preserving the integrity of
 4 its election process”. *Burson v. Freeman*, 504 U.S.
 5 191, 199 (1992).

6 (22) The First Amendment does not preclude
 7 the regulation of some intentionally false speech,
 8 even if it is political in nature. As the Supreme
 9 Court of the United States has recognized, “[t]hat
 10 speech is used as a tool for political ends does not
 11 automatically bring it under the protective mantle of
 12 the Constitution. For the use of the known lie as a
 13 tool is at once at odds with the premises of demo-
 14 cratic government and with the orderly manner in
 15 which economic, social, or political change is to be
 16 effected. . . . Hence the knowingly false statement
 17 and the false statement made with reckless disregard
 18 of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection.”.
 19 *Garrison v. Louisiana*, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964).

20 **SEC. 3. PROHIBITION ON DECEPTIVE COMMUNICATIONS**
 21 **REGARDING FEDERAL ELECTIONS.**

22 (a) PROHIBITION.—Subsection (b) of section 2004 of
 23 the Revised Statutes (52 U.S.C. 10101(b)) is amended—

24 (1) by striking “No person” and inserting the
 25 following:

1 “(1) IN GENERAL.—No person”; and

2 (2) by adding at the end the following new
3 paragraphs:

4 “(2) PROHIBITION ON DECEPTIVE COMMUNICA-
5 TIONS REGARDING FEDERAL ELECTIONS.—

6 “(A) FALSE STATEMENTS.—No person,
7 whether acting under color of law or otherwise,
8 shall, within 60 days before an election de-
9 scribed in paragraph (4), by any means, includ-
10 ing by means of written, electronic, or tele-
11 phonic communications, communicate or cause
12 to be communicated information described in
13 subparagraph (C), or produce information de-
14 scribed in subparagraph (C) with the intent
15 that such information be communicated, if such
16 person—

17 “(i) knows such information to be ma-
18 terially false; and

19 “(ii) has the intent to impede or pre-
20 vent another person from exercising the
21 right to vote in an election described in
22 paragraph (4).

23 “(B) USE OF GENERATIVE ARTIFICIAL IN-
24 TELLIGENCE.—No person, whether acting
25 under color of law or otherwise, shall use an ar-

1 tificial intelligence system, including a genera-
2 tive artificial intelligence system, to produce in-
3 formation described in subparagraph (C) within
4 60 days before an election described in para-
5 graph (4) if such person—

6 “(i) has the intent to use the system
7 to produce false information; and

8 “(ii) has the intent to use the system
9 to impede or prevent another person from
10 exercising the right to vote in an election
11 described in paragraph (4).

12 “(C) INFORMATION DESCRIBED.—Informa-
13 tion is described in this subparagraph if such
14 information is regarding—

15 “(i) the time, place, or manner of
16 holding any election described in para-
17 graph (4); or

18 “(ii) the qualifications for or restric-
19 tions on voter eligibility for any such elec-
20 tion, including—

21 “(I) any criminal, civil, or other
22 legal penalties associated with voting
23 in any such election; or

1 “(II) information regarding a
2 voter’s registration status or eligi-
3 bility.

4 “(3) HINDERING, INTERFERING WITH, OR PRE-
5 VENTING VOTING OR REGISTERING TO VOTE.—No
6 person, whether acting under color of law or other-
7 wise, shall intentionally hinder, interfere with, or
8 prevent another person from voting, registering to
9 vote, or aiding another person to vote or register to
10 vote in an election described in paragraph (4), in-
11 cluding by operating a polling place or ballot box
12 that falsely purports to be an official location estab-
13 lished for such an election by a unit of government.

14 “(4) ELECTION DESCRIBED.—An election de-
15 scribed in this paragraph is any general, primary,
16 runoff, or special election held solely or in part for
17 the purpose of nominating or electing a candidate
18 for the office of President, Vice President, Presi-
19 dential elector, Member of the Senate, Member of
20 the House of Representatives, or Delegate or Com-
21 missioner from a Territory or possession.

22 “(5) DEFINITIONS.—

23 “(A) ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE.—The
24 term ‘artificial intelligence’ has the meaning
25 given the term in section 5002 of the National

1 Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act of 2020 (15
2 U.S.C. 9401).

3 “(B) GENERATIVE ARTIFICIAL INTEL-
4 LIGENCE.—The term ‘generative artificial intel-
5 ligence’ means the class of artificial intelligence
6 models that emulate the structure and charac-
7 teristics of input data in order to generate de-
8 rived synthetic content. This can include im-
9 ages, videos, audio, text, and other digital con-
10 tent.”.

11 (b) PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION.—

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (c) of section
13 2004 of the Revised Statutes (52 U.S.C. 10101(c))
14 is amended—

15 (A) by striking “Whenever any person”
16 and inserting the following:

17 “(1) IN GENERAL.—Whenever any person”; and

18 (B) by adding at the end the following new
19 paragraph:

20 “(2) CIVIL ACTION.—Any person aggrieved by a
21 violation of this section may institute a civil action
22 for preventive relief, including an application in a
23 United States district court for a permanent or tem-
24 porary injunction, restraining order, or other order.
25 In any such action, the court, in its discretion, may

1 allow the prevailing party a reasonable attorney’s fee
 2 as part of the costs.”.

3 (2) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—Section 2004
 4 of the Revised Statutes (52 U.S.C. 10101) is
 5 amended—

6 (A) in subsection (e), by striking “sub-
 7 section (c)” and inserting “subsection (c)(1)”;
 8 and

9 (B) in subsection (g), by striking “sub-
 10 section (c)” and inserting “subsection (c)(1)”.

11 (c) CRIMINAL PENALTIES.—

12 (1) DECEPTIVE ACTS.—Section 594 of title 18,
 13 United States Code, is amended—

14 (A) by striking “Whoever intimidates” and
 15 inserting “(a) IN GENERAL.—Whoever intimi-
 16 dates”;

17 (B) by striking “at any election” and in-
 18 serting “at any general, primary, runoff, or spe-
 19 cial election”; and

20 (C) by adding at the end the following new
 21 subsections:

22 “(b) DECEPTIVE ACTS.—

23 “(1) FALSE STATEMENTS REGARDING FEDERAL
 24 ELECTIONS.—

1 “(A) PROHIBITION.—It shall be unlawful
 2 for any person, whether acting under color of
 3 law or otherwise, within 60 days before an elec-
 4 tion described in subsection (d), by any means,
 5 including by means of written, electronic, or tel-
 6 ephonic communications, to communicate or
 7 cause to be communicated information de-
 8 scribed in subparagraph (B), or produce infor-
 9 mation described in subparagraph (B) with the
 10 intent that such information be communicated,
 11 if such person—

12 “(i) knows such information to be ma-
 13 terially false; and

14 “(ii) has the intent to impede or pre-
 15 vent another person from exercising the
 16 right to vote in an election described in
 17 subsection (d).

18 “(B) INFORMATION DESCRIBED.—Infor-
 19 mation is described in this subparagraph if such
 20 information is regarding—

21 “(i) the time or place of holding any
 22 election described in subsection (d); or

23 “(ii) the qualifications for or restric-
 24 tions on voter eligibility for any such elec-
 25 tion, including—

1 “(I) any criminal, civil, or other
2 legal penalties associated with voting
3 in any such election; or

4 “(II) information regarding a
5 voter’s registration status or eligi-
6 bility.

7 “(2) PENALTY.—Any person who violates para-
8 graph (1) shall be fined under this title, imprisoned
9 for not more than 1 year, or both.

10 “(c) HINDERING, INTERFERING WITH, OR PRE-
11 VENTING VOTING OR REGISTERING TO VOTE.—

12 “(1) PROHIBITION.—It shall be unlawful for
13 any person, whether acting under color of law or
14 otherwise, to corruptly hinder, interfere with, or pre-
15 vent another person from voting, registering to vote,
16 or aiding another person to vote or register to vote
17 in an election described in subsection (d).

18 “(2) PENALTY.—Any person who violates para-
19 graph (1) shall be fined under this title, imprisoned
20 for not more than 1 year, or both.

21 “(d) ELECTION DESCRIBED.—An election described
22 in this subsection is any general, primary, runoff, or spe-
23 cial election held solely or in part for the purpose of nomi-
24 nating or electing a candidate for the office of President,
25 Vice President, Presidential elector, Senator, Member of

1 the House of Representatives, or Delegate or Resident
2 Commissioner to the Congress.”.

3 (2) SENTENCING GUIDELINES.—

4 (A) REVIEW AND AMENDMENT.—Not later
5 than 180 days after the date of enactment of
6 this Act, the United States Sentencing Commis-
7 sion, pursuant to its authority under section
8 994 of title 28, United States Code, and in ac-
9 cordance with this section, shall review and, if
10 appropriate, amend the Federal sentencing
11 guidelines and policy statements applicable to
12 persons convicted of any offense under section
13 594 of title 18, United States Code, as amend-
14 ed by this section.

15 (B) AUTHORIZATION.—The United States
16 Sentencing Commission may amend the Federal
17 Sentencing Guidelines in accordance with the
18 procedures set forth in section 21(a) of the Sen-
19 tencing Act of 1987 (28 U.S.C. 994 note) as
20 though the authority under that section had not
21 expired.

22 (3) PAYMENTS FOR REFRAINING FROM VOT-
23 ING.—Subsection (c) of section 11 of the Voting
24 Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. 10307) is amended
25 by striking “either for registration to vote or for vot-

1 ing” and inserting “for registration to vote, for vot-
 2 ing, or for not voting”.

3 **SEC. 4. CORRECTIVE ACTION.**

4 (a) CORRECTIVE ACTION.—

5 (1) IN GENERAL.—If the Attorney General re-
 6 ceives a credible report that materially false informa-
 7 tion has been or is being communicated in violation
 8 of section 2004(b)(2) of the Revised Statutes (52
 9 U.S.C. 10101(b)(2)), as added by section 3(a), and
 10 if the Attorney General determines that State and
 11 local election officials have not taken adequate steps
 12 to promptly communicate accurate information to
 13 correct the materially false information, the Attor-
 14 ney General shall, pursuant to the written proce-
 15 dures and standards under subsection (b), commu-
 16 nicate to the public, by any means, including by
 17 means of written, electronic, or telephonic commu-
 18 nications, accurate information designed to correct
 19 the materially false information.

20 (2) COMMUNICATION OF CORRECTIVE INFORMA-
 21 TION.—Any information communicated by the Attor-
 22 ney General under paragraph (1)—

23 (A) shall—

24 (i) be accurate and objective;

1 (ii) consist of only the information
 2 necessary to correct the materially false in-
 3 formation that has been or is being com-
 4 municated; and

5 (iii) to the extent practicable, be by a
 6 means that the Attorney General deter-
 7 mines will reach the persons to whom the
 8 materially false information has been or is
 9 being communicated; and

10 (B) shall not be designed to favor or dis-
 11 favor any particular candidate, organization, or
 12 political party.

13 (b) WRITTEN PROCEDURES AND STANDARDS FOR
 14 TAKING CORRECTIVE ACTION.—

15 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
 16 after the date of enactment of this Act, the Attorney
 17 General shall publish written procedures and stand-
 18 ards for determining when and how corrective action
 19 will be taken under this section.

20 (2) INCLUSION OF APPROPRIATE DEADLINES.—
 21 The procedures and standards under paragraph (1)
 22 shall include appropriate deadlines, based in part on
 23 the number of days remaining before the upcoming
 24 election.

1 (3) CONSULTATION.—In developing the proce-
2 dures and standards under paragraph (1), the Attor-
3 ney General shall consult with the Election Assist-
4 ance Commission, State and local election officials,
5 civil rights organizations, voting rights groups, voter
6 protection groups, and other interested community
7 organizations.

8 (c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There
9 are authorized to be appropriated to the Attorney General
10 such sums as may be necessary to carry out this subtitle.

11 **SEC. 5. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.**

12 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after
13 each general election for Federal office, the Attorney Gen-
14 eral shall submit to Congress a report compiling all allega-
15 tions received by the Attorney General of deceptive prac-
16 tices described in paragraphs (2) and (3) of section
17 2004(b) of the Revised Statutes (52 U.S.C. 10101(b)), as
18 added by section 3(a), relating to the general election for
19 Federal office and any primary, runoff, or a special elec-
20 tion for Federal office held in the 2 years preceding the
21 general election.

22 (b) CONTENTS.—

23 (1) IN GENERAL.—Each report submitted
24 under subsection (a) shall include—

1 (A) a description of each allegation of a
2 deceptive practice described in subsection (a),
3 including the geographic location, racial and
4 ethnic composition, and language minority-
5 group membership of the persons toward whom
6 the alleged deceptive practice was directed;

7 (B) the status of the investigation of each
8 allegation described in subparagraph (A);

9 (C) a description of each corrective action
10 taken by the Attorney General under section
11 4(a) in response to an allegation described in
12 subparagraph (A);

13 (D) a description of each referral of an al-
14 legation described in subparagraph (A) to other
15 Federal, State, or local agencies;

16 (E) to the extent information is available,
17 a description of any civil action instituted under
18 section 2004(c)(2) of the Revised Statutes (52
19 U.S.C. 10101(c)(2)), as added by section 3(b),
20 in connection with an allegation described in
21 subparagraph (A); and

22 (F) a description of any criminal prosecu-
23 tion instituted under subsection (b) or (c) of
24 section 594 of title 18, United States Code, as
25 amended by section 3(c), in connection with the

1 receipt of an allegation described in subpara-
2 graph (A) by the Attorney General.

3 (2) EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN INFORMATION.—

4 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Attorney General
5 shall not include in a report submitted under
6 subsection (a) any information protected from
7 disclosure by rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of
8 Criminal Procedure or any Federal criminal
9 statute.

10 (B) EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN OTHER IN-
11 FORMATION.—The Attorney General may deter-
12 mine that the following information shall not be
13 included in a report submitted under subsection
14 (a):

15 (i) Any information that is privileged.

16 (ii) Any information concerning an
17 ongoing investigation.

18 (iii) Any information concerning a
19 criminal or civil proceeding conducted
20 under seal.

21 (iv) Any other nonpublic information
22 that the Attorney General determines the
23 disclosure of which could reasonably be ex-
24 pected to infringe on the rights of any in-

1 dividual or adversely affect the integrity of
2 a pending or future criminal investigation.

3 (c) REPORT MADE PUBLIC.—On the date that the
4 Attorney General submits the report under subsection (a),
5 the Attorney General shall also make the report publicly
6 available through the internet and other appropriate
7 means.

8 **SEC. 6. PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION BY ELECTION OFFI-**
9 **CIALS.**

10 Subsection (c)(2) of section 2004 of the Revised Stat-
11 utes (52 U.S.C. 10101(b)), as added by section 3(b), is
12 amended—

13 (1) by striking “Any person” and inserting the
14 following:

15 “(A) IN GENERAL.—Any person”; and

16 (2) by adding at the end the following new sub-
17 paragraph:

18 “(B) INTIMIDATION, ETC.—

19 “(i) IN GENERAL.—A person ag-
20 grievied by a violation of subsection (b)(1)
21 shall include, without limitation, an officer
22 responsible for maintaining order and pre-
23 venting intimidation, threats, or coercion
24 in or around a location at which voters
25 may cast their votes.

“(ii) CORRECTIVE ACTION.—If the Attorney General receives a credible report that conduct that violates or would be reasonably likely to violate subsection (b)(1) has occurred or is likely to occur, and if the Attorney General determines that State and local officials have not taken adequate steps to promptly communicate that such conduct would violate subsection (b)(1) or applicable State or local laws, the Attorney General shall communicate to the public, by any means, including by means of written, electronic, or telephonic communications, accurate information designed to convey the unlawfulness of proscribed conduct under subsection (b)(1) and the responsibilities of and resources available to State and local officials to prevent or correct such violations.”.

SEC. 7. MAKING INTIMIDATION OF TABULATION, CANVASS, AND CERTIFICATION EFFORTS A CRIME.

Section 12(1) of the National Voter Registration Act (52 U.S.C. 20511) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (B), by striking “or” at the end; and

1 (2) by adding at the end the following new sub-
2 paragraph:

3 “(D) processing or scanning ballots, or
4 tabulating, canvassing, or certifying voting re-
5 sults; or”.

○