

Calendar No. 242

119TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. 2684

To support countries in Latin America and the Caribbean that maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan, to counter efforts by the People's Republic of China to coerce or pressure governments into breaking such ties, to deepen coordination with Taiwan on diplomatic, development, and economic engagement in the Western Hemisphere, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

SEPTEMBER 2, 2025

Mr. MERKLEY (for himself, Mr. CURTIS, Mr. KAINE, Mr. RICKETTS, and Mr. BENNET) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

OCTOBER 30, 2025

Reported by Mr. RISCH, with an amendment

[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in *italic*]

A BILL

To support countries in Latin America and the Caribbean that maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan, to counter efforts by the People's Republic of China to coerce or pressure governments into breaking such ties, to deepen coordination with Taiwan on diplomatic, development, and economic engagement in the Western Hemisphere, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
 2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “United States-Taiwan
 5 Partnership in the Americas Act”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress finds the following:

8 (1) Taiwan is a democratic partner of the
 9 United States, and countries that maintain ties with
 10 Taiwan often share our Nation’s commitment to
 11 transparency, good governance, and human rights.

12 (2) The People’s Republic of China has pres-
 13 sured Taiwan’s remaining 7 diplomatic allies in
 14 Latin America and the Caribbean to sever diplo-
 15 matic relations with Taiwan by leveraging opaque
 16 development deals and backroom pressure.

17 (3) The United States has an interest in ensur-
 18 ing countries in Latin America and the Caribbean
 19 can make sovereign foreign policy decisions free
 20 from coercion or financial manipulation by the Peo-
 21 ple’s Republic of China.

22 **SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

23 It is the policy of the United States—

1 (1) to support countries in Latin America and
2 the Caribbean that maintain diplomatic relations
3 with Taiwan;

4 (2) to counter efforts by the People's Republic
5 of China to coerce or pressure governments in the
6 region into breaking diplomatic ties with Taiwan;
7 and

8 (3) to deepen coordination with Taiwan on its
9 development and economic engagement in the West-
10 ern Hemisphere.

11 **SEC. 4. MONITORING THE ECONOMIC INFLUENCE OF THE**
12 **PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**

13 (a) **INFRASTRUCTURE INFLUENCE RISK MECHA-**
14 **NISM.**—The Secretary of State shall establish a mecha-
15 nism to track and respond to infrastructure and develop-
16 ment projects by the People's Republic of China in coun-
17 tries that maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

18 (b) **FUNCTIONS.**—The mechanism required under
19 subsection (a) shall—

20 (1) identify projects referred to in such sub-
21 section that carry strategic risks or involve non-
22 transparent financing;

23 (2) coordinate appropriate United States diplo-
24 matic or technical responses to such projects; and

1 ~~(3)~~ share relevant information with Congress
2 and with United States allies.

3 **SEC. 5. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.**

4 ~~(a)~~ SEMIANNUAL STATUS REPORT.—The Secretary
5 of State shall submit semiannual status reports to the
6 Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the
7 Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representa-
8 tives regarding governments in Latin America that have
9 taken steps to discontinue diplomatic relations with Tai-
10 wan.

11 ~~(b)~~ DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT PLAN.—If the Sec-
12 retary of State determines that a government in a country
13 referred to in subsection (a) is taking steps to terminate
14 diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the Secretary, not later
15 than 30 days after such determination, shall submit a re-
16 port to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate
17 and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
18 Representatives that includes a detailed plan to support
19 the maintenance of official diplomatic relations between
20 such government and Taiwan.

21 ~~(c)~~ ANNUAL REPORT.—

22 ~~(1)~~ IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
23 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and an-
24 nually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Sec-
25 retary of State shall submit a report to the Com-

mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
resentatives that includes—

(A) an assessment of the goals, invest-
ments, and interests of the People's Republic of
China in Latin America and the Caribbean that
maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan;

(B) an overview of the pressure tactics and
influence campaigns carried out by the People's
Republic of China in countries in Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean that maintain diplomatic
relations with Taiwan; and

(C) the actions taken by the Department
of State during the most recent 12-month pe-
riod to implement this Act by—

(i) supporting Taiwan's diplomatic
partners in Latin America and the Carib-
bean; and

(ii) countering the efforts of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China to isolate Taiwan
from its Latin American and Caribbean al-
lies.

(2) FORM.—Each report required under para-
graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form,
but may include a classified annex.

1 **SEC. 6. TAIWAN-AMERICAS STRATEGIC COORDINATION.**

2 The Secretary of State should take steps to expand
3 United States coordination with countries in Latin Amer-
4 ica and the Caribbean with respect to Taiwan by—

5 (1) coordinating joint programming and tech-
6 nical cooperation with United States allies;

7 (2) aligning public diplomacy efforts; and

8 (3) encouraging collaboration between United
9 States embassies and Taiwan’s representative offices
10 in Latin America and the Caribbean.

11 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

12 *This Act may be cited as the “United States - Taiwan*
13 *Partnership in the Americas Act”.*

14 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

15 *Congress finds the following:*

16 (1) *Taiwan is a democratic partner of the*
17 *United States, and countries that maintain ties with*
18 *Taiwan often share our Nation’s commitment to*
19 *transparency, good governance, and human rights.*

20 (2) *The People’s Republic of China has pressured*
21 *Taiwan’s remaining 7 diplomatic allies in Latin*
22 *America and the Caribbean to sever diplomatic rela-*
23 *tions with Taiwan by leveraging opaque development*
24 *deals and backroom pressure.*

25 (3) *The United States has an interest in ensur-*
26 *ing countries in Latin America and the Caribbean*

1 *can make sovereign foreign policy decisions free from*
2 *coercion or financial manipulation by the People's*
3 *Republic of China.*

4 **SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

5 *It is the policy of the United States—*

6 *(1) to support countries in Latin America and*
7 *the Caribbean that maintain diplomatic relations*
8 *with Taiwan;*

9 *(2) to counter efforts by the People's Republic of*
10 *China to coerce or pressure governments in the region*
11 *into breaking diplomatic ties with Taiwan; and*

12 *(3) to deepen coordination with Taiwan on its*
13 *development and economic engagement in the Western*
14 *Hemisphere.*

15 **SEC. 4. MONITORING THE ECONOMIC INFLUENCE OF THE**
16 **PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**

17 *(a) INFRASTRUCTURE INFLUENCE RISK MECHA-*
18 *NISM.—The Secretary of State shall establish a mechanism*
19 *to track and respond to infrastructure and development*
20 *projects by the People's Republic of China in countries that*
21 *maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan.*

22 *(b) FUNCTIONS.—The mechanism required under sub-*
23 *section (a) shall—*

1 (1) *identify projects referred to in such sub-*
2 *section that carry strategic risks or involve non-trans-*
3 *parent financing;*

4 (2) *coordinate appropriate United States diplo-*
5 *matic or technical responses to such projects; and*

6 (3) *share relevant information with Congress*
7 *and with United States allies.*

8 **SEC. 5. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.**

9 (a) *SEMIANNUAL STATUS REPORT.*—*The Secretary of*
10 *State shall submit semiannual status reports to the Com-*
11 *mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Com-*
12 *mittee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives*
13 *regarding governments in Latin America that have taken*
14 *steps to discontinue diplomatic relations with Taiwan.*

15 (b) *DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT PLAN.*—*If the Sec-*
16 *retary of State determines that a government in a country*
17 *referred to in subsection (a) is taking steps to terminate*
18 *diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the Secretary, not later*
19 *than 30 days after such determination, shall submit a re-*
20 *port to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate*
21 *and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-*
22 *resentatives that includes a detailed plan to support the*
23 *maintenance of official diplomatic relations between such*
24 *government and Taiwan.*

25 (c) *ANNUAL REPORT.*—

1 (1) *IN GENERAL.*—Not later than 180 days after
2 the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually
3 thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of
4 State shall submit a report to the Committee on For-
5 eign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
6 Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that
7 includes—

8 (A) an assessment of the goals, investments,
9 and interests of the People’s Republic of China
10 in Latin America and the Caribbean that main-
11 tain diplomatic relations with Taiwan;

12 (B) an overview of the pressure tactics and
13 influence campaigns carried out by the People’s
14 Republic of China in countries in Latin America
15 and the Caribbean that maintain diplomatic re-
16 lations with Taiwan; and

17 (C) the actions taken by the Department of
18 State during the most recent 12-month period to
19 implement this Act by—

20 (i) supporting Taiwan’s diplomatic
21 partners in Latin America and the Carib-
22 bean; and

23 (ii) countering the efforts of the Peo-
24 ple’s Republic of China to isolate Taiwan

1 *from its Latin American and Caribbean al-*
 2 *lies.*

3 (2) *FORM.—Each report required under para-*
 4 *graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but*
 5 *may include a classified annex.*

6 **SEC. 6. TAIWAN-AMERICAS STRATEGIC COORDINATION.**

7 *The Secretary of State should take steps to expand*
 8 *United States coordination with countries in Latin Amer-*
 9 *ica and the Caribbean with respect to Taiwan by—*

10 (1) *coordinating joint programming and tech-*
 11 *nical cooperation with United States allies;*

12 (2) *aligning public diplomacy efforts; and*

13 (3) *encouraging collaboration between United*
 14 *States embassies and Taiwan’s representative offices*
 15 *in Latin America and the Caribbean.*

16 **SEC. 7. BRIEFING ON EFFORTS TO SUPPORT TAIWAN’S RE-**
 17 **SPONSE TO MALIGN INFLUENCE OPER-**
 18 **ATIONS.**

19 (a) *IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after the*
 20 *date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,*
 21 *in coordination with the heads of relevant Federal depart-*
 22 *ments and agencies, shall brief the appropriate congres-*
 23 *sional committees by—*

24 (1) *describing existing United States efforts sup-*
 25 *porting the Taiwan government’s efforts in countering*

1 *the malign influence operations of the Government of*
2 *the People's Republic of China and the Chinese Com-*
3 *munist Party; and*

4 *(2) providing recommendations, developed in co-*
5 *ordination with the heads of relevant Federal agencies*
6 *and international partners, for identifying, and pro-*
7 *viding targeted assistance to address, remaining*
8 *vulnerabilities in the Taiwan government's efforts to*
9 *counter such malign influence operations.*

10 *(b) BRIEFING ELEMENTS.—The briefing required*
11 *under subsection (a)(1) shall include the response of the*
12 *United States to the People's Republic of China malign in-*
13 *fluence campaigns and cyber-intrusions targeting Taiwan,*
14 *including—*

15 *(1) United States assistance in building the ca-*
16 *pacities of Taiwanese officials, media entities, and pri-*
17 *vate-sector entities to document and expose propa-*
18 *ganda and malign foreign influence supported by the*
19 *Government of the People's Republic of China, the*
20 *Chinese Communist Party, or affiliated entities;*

21 *(2) United States assistance to the Taiwan gov-*
22 *ernment's efforts to develop a whole-of-government*
23 *strategy to respond to malign influence operations,*
24 *including election interference;*

1 (3) *exchanges and other technical assistance*
 2 *through which the United States has collaborated with*
 3 *Taiwan to strengthen Taiwan’s legal system’s ability*
 4 *to respond to malign influence operations; and*

5 (4) *the extent to which like-minded governments*
 6 *have collaborated with the Taiwan government on*
 7 *ways to address malign influence operations sup-*
 8 *ported by the Government of the People’s Republic of*
 9 *China and the Chinese Communist Party.*

10 (c) *DEFINITIONS.—In this section:*

11 (1) *APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-*
 12 *TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional commit-*
 13 *tees” means the Committee on Foreign Relations of*
 14 *the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of*
 15 *the House of Representatives.*

16 (2) *MALIGN INFLUENCE OPERATIONS.—The term*
 17 *“malign influence operations” means the coordinated*
 18 *and often concealed application of media manipula-*
 19 *tion, economic coercion, cyber-intrusions, targeted in-*
 20 *vestments, and academic censorship that is in-*
 21 *tended—*

22 (A)(i) *to corrupt businesses and political*
 23 *and nongovernmental institutions;*

24 (ii) *to interfere in democratic elections; and*

(iii) to encourage self-censorship of views at odds with those of the Government of the People's Republic of China or the Chinese Communist Party;

(B) to foster attitudes, behavior, decisions, or outcomes in Taiwan and elsewhere that support the interests of the Government of the People's Republic of China or the Chinese Communist Party; or

(C) to undermine the administrative activities or daily operations of the Taiwan government.

SEC. 8. BRIEFING ON DETERRENCE IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT.

Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall brief the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives by providing—

(1) an assessment of the military posture of Taiwan and the United States as it specifically pertains to the deterrence of military conflict and conflict readiness in the Taiwan Strait; and

(2) an analysis of whether current Taiwan and United States policies sufficiently deter the People's

- 1 *Republic of China's efforts to determine the future of*
- 2 *Taiwan by other than peaceful means, taking into ac-*
- 3 *count the changing military balance in the Taiwan*
- 4 *Strait.*

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A BILL

To support countries in Latin America and the Caribbean that maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan, to counter efforts by the People's Republic of China to coerce or pressure governments into breaking such ties, to deepen coordination with Taiwan on diplomatic, development, and economic engagement in the Western Hemisphere, and for other purposes.

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