

119TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. 1588

To support United States policy toward Taiwan.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 5, 2025

Mr. MERKLEY (for himself and Mr. CURTIS) introduced the following bill;
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

A BILL

To support United States policy toward Taiwan.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Taiwan Relations Re-
5 inforcement Act of 2025”.

6 **SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

7 It is the sense of Congress that the United States
8 Government should continue strengthening cooperation
9 with Taiwan under the framework of the Taiwan Relations
10 Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and the
11 Six Assurances with consideration of the ongoing military

1 buildup in China and the imbalance in the security envi-
2 ronment in the Taiwan Strait, including by—

3 (1) promoting dignity and respect for its Tai-
4 wan counterparts, who represent more than
5 23,000,000 citizens, by using the full range of the
6 United States Government’s diplomatic and financial
7 tools to promote Taiwan’s inclusion and meaningful
8 participation in international organizations, as well
9 as in bilateral and multilateral security summits,
10 military exercises, and economic dialogues and fo-
11 rums;

12 (2) urging Taiwan to increase its own invest-
13 ments in military capabilities that support imple-
14 mentation of its asymmetric defense strategy; and

15 (3) prioritizing the negotiation of a free-trade
16 agreement with Taiwan that provides high levels of
17 labor rights and environmental protection as soon as
18 possible to deepen economic ties between the United
19 States and Taiwan.

20 **SEC. 3. INTERAGENCY POLICY COORDINATION ON TAIWAN.**

21 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
22 United States to create and execute a plan for enhancing
23 its relationship with Taiwan by strengthening the robust
24 partnership that meets the challenges of the 21st century
25 while remaining faithful to United States principles and

1 values in keeping with the Taiwan Relations Act and the
2 Six Assurances.

3 (b) INTERAGENCY TAIWAN POLICY TASK FORCE.—

4 Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment
5 of this Act, the President shall review and consolidate ex-
6 isting interagency processes related to Taiwan (including
7 formal National Security Council-led processes and other
8 informal, ad-hoc interagency coordination processes) to
9 create an interagency Taiwan Policy Task Force con-
10 sisting of senior officials from the Office of the President,
11 the National Security Council, the Department of State,
12 the Department of Defense, the Department of the Treas-
13 ury, the Department of Commerce, and the Office of the
14 United States Trade Representative.

15 (c) REPORT.—The interagency Taiwan Policy Task
16 Force established under subsection (b) shall contribute an-
17 nually to existing congressionally mandated reports out-
18 lining policy and actions to be taken in the next year to
19 enhance the United States partnership and relations with
20 Taiwan, including reports required under the Taiwan En-
21 hanced Resilience Act (subtitle A of title XII of Public
22 Law 117–263), the Taiwan Allies International Protection
23 and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act (Public Law
24 116–135), and the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115–
25 135).

1 **SEC. 4. AMERICAN INSTITUTE IN TAIWAN.**

2 (a) APPOINTMENT OF DIRECTOR.—The Director of
3 the American Institute in Taiwan’s Taipei office shall be
4 appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
5 consent of the Senate, and effective upon enactment of
6 this Act shall have the title of Representative.

7 (b) VACANCY.—A vacancy in the position of Director
8 shall be filled within 60 days. If such position remains un-
9 filled for more than 60 days, the Assistant Secretary of
10 State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, in consultation
11 with the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs,
12 shall immediately appoint a senior Foreign Service Officer
13 to serve as acting Director until a new Director is ap-
14 pointed and confirmed for such position pursuant to sub-
15 section (a).

16 **SEC. 5. PARTICIPATION OF TAIWAN IN INTERNATIONAL OR-**
17 **GANIZATIONS.**

18 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
19 United States to promote Taiwan’s inclusion and mean-
20 ingful participation in meetings held by international orga-
21 nizations.

22 (b) SUPPORT FOR MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION.—
23 The Permanent Representative of the United States to the
24 United Nations and other relevant United States officials
25 should actively support Taiwan’s meaningful participation

1 in international organizations, including membership
2 where applicable.

3 (c) REPORT.—Beginning not later than one year
4 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
5 of State shall annually incorporate reporting on China’s
6 efforts to block Taiwan’s meaningful participation and in-
7 clusion at the United Nations and other international bod-
8 ies, and recommend appropriate responses to be taken by
9 the United States, as part of existing congressionally man-
10 dated reports, including reports required under the Tai-
11 wan Enhanced Resilience Act (subtitle A of title XII of
12 Public Law 117–263), the Taiwan Allies International
13 Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act
14 (Public Law 116–135), and the Taiwan Travel Act (Public
15 Law 115–135).

16 **SEC. 6. INVITATION OF TAIWAN COUNTERPARTS TO HIGH-**
17 **LEVEL BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL FO-**
18 **RUMS AND EXERCISES.**

19 It is the policy of the United States—

20 (1) to invite Taiwan counterparts to participate
21 in high-level bilateral and multilateral summits, mili-
22 tary exercises, and economic dialogues and forums
23 on issues of mutual concern;

24 (2) that the United States Government and
25 Taiwan counterparts should resume meetings under

1 either the United States-Taiwan Trade and Invest-
2 ment Framework Agreement, the United States-Tai-
3 wan Initiative on 21st Century Trade, or other ap-
4 propriate mechanisms to reach a bilateral free trade
5 agreement;

6 (3) that the United States Government should
7 invite Taiwan to participate in bilateral and multi-
8 lateral military training exercises; and

9 (4) that the United States Government and
10 Taiwan counterparts should engage in a regular and
11 routine strategic bilateral dialogue on arms sales in
12 accordance with Foreign Military Sales mechanisms,
13 and the United States Government should support
14 export licenses for direct commercial sales sup-
15 porting Taiwan's indigenous defensive capabilities.

16 **SEC. 7. PROHIBITIONS AGAINST UNDERMINING UNITED**
17 **STATES POLICY REGARDING TAIWAN.**

18 (a) FINDING.—Congress finds that the efforts by the
19 Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and
20 the Chinese Communist Party to compel private United
21 States businesses, corporations, and nongovernmental en-
22 tities to use PRC-mandated language to describe the rela-
23 tionship between Taiwan and China are an intolerable at-
24 tempt to enforce political censorship globally and should
25 be considered an attack on the fundamental underpinnings

1 of all democratic and free societies, including the constitu-
2 tionally protected right to freedom of speech.

3 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
4 gress that the President, in coordination with United
5 States businesses and nongovernmental entities and in
6 consultation with Congress, should develop and implement
7 a strategy for interacting with the Government of the Peo-
8 ple’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party
9 and affiliated entities, the aim of which is—

10 (1) to counter PRC sharp power operations,
11 which threaten free speech, academic freedom, and
12 the normal operations of United States businesses
13 and nongovernmental entities; and

14 (2) to counter PRC efforts to censor the way
15 the world refers to issues deemed sensitive to the
16 Government of the People’s Republic of China and
17 Chinese Communist Party leaders, including issues
18 related to Taiwan, Tibet, the Tiananmen Square
19 Massacre, and the mass internment of Uyghurs and
20 other Turkic Muslims, among many other issues.

21 (c) PROHIBITION ON RECOGNITION OF PRC CLAIMS
22 TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER TAIWAN.—

23 (1) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of
24 Congress that—

1 (A) issues related to the sovereignty of
2 Taiwan are for the people of Taiwan to decide
3 through the democratic process they have estab-
4 lished;

5 (B) the dispute between the People's Re-
6 public of China and Taiwan must be resolved
7 peacefully and with the assent of the people of
8 Taiwan;

9 (C) the primary obstacle to peaceful reso-
10 lution is the authoritarian nature of the PRC
11 political system under one-party rule of the Chi-
12 nese Communist Party, which is fundamentally
13 incompatible with Taiwan's democracy; and

14 (D) any attempt to coerce the people of
15 Taiwan to accept a political arrangement that
16 would subject them to direct or indirect rule by
17 the PRC, including a "one country, two sys-
18 tems" framework, would constitute a grave
19 challenge to United States security interests in
20 the region.

21 (2) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of
22 the United States to oppose any attempt by the
23 PRC authorities to unilaterally impose a timetable
24 or deadline for unification on Taiwan.

1 (3) PROHIBITION ON RECOGNITION OF PRC
2 CLAIMS WITHOUT ASSENT OF PEOPLE OF TAIWAN.—
3 No department or agency of the United States Gov-
4 ernment should formally or informally recognize
5 PRC claims to sovereignty over Taiwan without the
6 assent of the people of Taiwan, as expressed directly
7 through the democratic process.

8 (4) TREATMENT OF TAIWAN GOVERNMENT.—

9 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Department of
10 State and other United States Government
11 agencies should treat the democratically elected
12 Government of Taiwan as the legitimate rep-
13 resentative of the people of Taiwan. Notwith-
14 standing the continued supporting role of the
15 American Institute in Taiwan in carrying out
16 United States foreign policy and protecting
17 United States interests in Taiwan, the United
18 States Government should not place any restric-
19 tions on the ability of officials of the Depart-
20 ment of State and other United States Govern-
21 ment agencies from interacting directly and
22 routinely with counterparts in the Taiwan gov-
23 ernment.

24 (B) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in
25 this paragraph shall be construed as entailing

1 restoration of diplomatic relations with the Re-
2 public of China, which were terminated on Jan-
3 uary 1, 1979, or altering the United States
4 Government's position on Taiwan's inter-
5 national status.

6 (d) STRATEGY TO PROTECT UNITED STATES BUSI-
7 NESSES AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES FROM COER-
8 CION.—

9 (1) INITIAL REPORT.—Not later than 90 days
10 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
11 retary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of
12 Commerce, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the
13 heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall sub-
14 mit an unclassified report, with a classified annex if
15 necessary, to protect United States businesses and
16 nongovernmental entities from sharp power oper-
17 ations, including coercion and threats that lead to
18 censorship or self-censorship, or which compel com-
19 pliance with political or foreign policy positions of
20 the Government of the People's Republic of China
21 and the Chinese Communist Party. The strategy
22 shall include the following elements:

23 (A) Information on efforts by the Govern-
24 ment of the People's Republic of China to cen-
25 sor the websites of United States airlines, ho-

1 tels, and other businesses regarding the rela-
2 tionship between Taiwan and the People’s Re-
3 public of China.

4 (B) Information on efforts by the Govern-
5 ment of the People’s Republic of China to tar-
6 get United States nongovernmental entities
7 through sharp power operations intended to
8 weaken support for Taiwan.

9 (C) Information on United States Govern-
10 ment efforts to counter the threats posed by
11 Chinese state-sponsored propaganda and
12 disinformation, including information on best
13 practices, current successes, and existing bar-
14 riers to responding to this threat.

15 (D) Details of any actions undertaken to
16 create a code of conduct pursuant to subsection
17 (b) and a timetable for implementation.

18 (2) SUBSEQUENT REPORTING.—Beginning not
19 later than one year after submission of the report
20 required under paragraph (1), the Secretary of State
21 shall include the elements required in such report as
22 part of existing congressionally mandated reports,
23 including reports required under the Taiwan En-
24 hanced Resilience Act (subtitle A of title XII of Pub-
25 lic Law 117–263), the Taiwan Allies International

1 Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI)
2 Act (Public Law 116–135), and the Taiwan Travel
3 Act (Public Law 115–135).

4 **SEC. 8. REPORT AND STRATEGY TO SUPPORT TAIWAN'S RE-**
5 **SPONSE TO SHARP POWER OPERATIONS.**

6 (a) FINDING.—Taiwan is at the forefront in respond-
7 ing to sharp power operations supported by the Govern-
8 ment of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese
9 Communist Party.

10 (b) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
11 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
12 shall—

13 (1) submit to the appropriate congressional
14 committees a report on existing United States ef-
15 forts supporting the Taiwan government's efforts in
16 countering the Government of the People's Republic
17 of China and the Chinese Communist Party's sharp
18 power operations; and

19 (2) submit to the appropriate congressional
20 committees a strategy developed in coordination with
21 the heads of relevant Federal agencies and inter-
22 national partners to identify, and provide targeted
23 assistance to address, remaining vulnerabilities in
24 the Taiwan government's efforts to counter the Gov-

1 ernment of the People’s Republic of China and the
2 Chinese Communist Party’s sharp power operations.

3 (c) REPORT ELEMENTS.—The report required under
4 subsection (b)(1) shall describe the response of the United
5 States to People’s Republic of China propaganda and ma-
6 lign foreign influence campaigns and cyber-intrusions tar-
7 geting Taiwan, including the following elements:

8 (1) A description of assistance in building the
9 capacity of the Taiwan officials, media entities, and
10 private-sector entities to document and expose prop-
11 aganda and malign foreign influence supported by
12 the Government of the People’s Republic of China,
13 the Chinese Communist Party, or affiliated entities.

14 (2) A description of assistance to the Taiwan
15 government’s efforts to develop a whole-of-govern-
16 ment strategy to respond to sharp power operations,
17 including election interference.

18 (3) A description of exchanges and other tech-
19 nical assistance the United States has collaborated
20 with Taiwan on to strengthen Taiwan’s legal sys-
21 tem’s ability to respond to sharp power operations.

22 (4) An assessment of the extent to which the
23 Government of the People’s Republic of China and
24 the Chinese Communist Party have attempted to in-
25 fluence local political parties, financial institutions,

1 media organizations, and other entities, and the de-
2 gree to which these efforts could be considered suc-
3 cessful.

4 (5) An assessment of the extent to which like-
5 minded governments have collaborated with the Tai-
6 wan government on ways to address sharp power op-
7 erations supported by the Government of the Peo-
8 ple's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist
9 Party.

10 **SEC. 9. REPORT ON DETERRENCE IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT.**

11 (a) INITIAL REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after
12 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
13 State and the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the
14 appropriate congressional committees a joint report that
15 assesses the military posture of Taiwan and the United
16 States as it specifically pertains to the deterrence of mili-
17 tary conflict and conflict readiness in the Taiwan Strait.
18 In light of the changing military balance in the Taiwan
19 Strait, the report should include analysis of whether cur-
20 rent Taiwan and United States policies sufficiently deter
21 efforts to determine the future of Taiwan by other than
22 peaceful means.

23 (b) SUBSEQUENT REPORTING.—Beginning not later
24 than one year after submission of the report required
25 under subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall include

1 the elements required in such report as part of existing
2 congressionally mandated reports, including reports re-
3 quired under the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act (sub-
4 title A of title XII of Public Law 117–263), the Taiwan
5 Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initia-
6 tive (TAIPEI) Act (Public Law 116–135), and the Taiwan
7 Travel Act (Public Law 115–135).

8 **SEC. 10. DEFINITIONS.**

9 In this Act:

10 (1) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-**
11 **TEES.**—The term “appropriate congressional com-
12 mittees” means the Committee on Foreign Relations
13 of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs
14 of the House of Representatives.

15 (2) **SHARP POWER.**—The term “sharp power”
16 means the coordinated and often concealed applica-
17 tion of disinformation, media manipulation, eco-
18 nomic coercion, cyber-intrusions, targeted invest-
19 ments, and academic censorship that is intended—

20 (A) to corrupt political and nongovern-
21 mental institutions and interfere in democratic
22 elections and encourage self-censorship of views
23 at odds with those of the Government of the
24 People’s Republic of China or the Chinese Com-
25 munist Party; or

1 (B) to foster attitudes, behavior, decisions,
2 or outcomes in Taiwan and elsewhere that sup-
3 port the interests of the Government of the
4 People's Republic of China or the Chinese Com-
5 munist Party.

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