

119TH CONGRESS
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H. RES. 139

Calling on the United Kingdom, France, and Germany (E3) to initiate the snapback of sanctions on Iran under United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015).

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 14, 2025

Ms. TENNEY (for herself, Mr. GOTTHEIMER, Mr. WEBER of Texas, Mr. LAMALFA, and Mr. WILSON of South Carolina) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

RESOLUTION

Calling on the United Kingdom, France, and Germany (E3) to initiate the snapback of sanctions on Iran under United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015).

Whereas, on July 15, 2015, the P5+1 (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, and Germany), the European Union, and the Islamic Republic of Iran finalized the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA);

Whereas the JCPOA required the Government of Iran to implement constraints on its uranium enrichment and heavy water nuclear reactor programs, as well as allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor compliance with the agreement;

Whereas, on July 20, 2015, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 2231 (UNSCR 2231), which endorsed the JCPOA and provided for the termination of all previous UNSC resolutions targeting Iran’s nuclear program (1696, 1737, 1747, 1803 1835, and 1929), while maintaining United Nation’s arms restrictions on Iran for 5 years and United Nation’s prohibitions on Iran’s missile and drone activity for 8 years;

Whereas, pursuant to the JCPOA, Iran received significant sanctions relief from the previous sanctions imposed by the European Union, the United States, and previous UNSC resolutions;

Whereas Iran used this sanctions relief to fund its terrorist proxies, regional aggression, and its expansion of its ballistic missile program;

Whereas, on May 8, 2018, President Trump announced the United States was ceasing its participation in the JCPOA and reimposing sanctions against Iran that had been previously waived;

Whereas President Trump’s successful maximum pressure campaign imposed significant financial costs on Iran’s regime “to alter its course of malign activities and ensure that Iranian bad acts are no longer rewarded”;

Whereas, Iran has repeatedly violated the terms of the JCPOA and UNSCR 2231, including by—

- (1) lifting the cap on its stockpile of uranium;
- (2) increasing its enrichment activities to 60 percent purity, expanding its enrichment capabilities;
- (3) resuming its activity at prohibited nuclear facilities; and

(4) preventing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from being able to effectively monitor its nuclear activities;

Whereas, Iran repeatedly violated UNSCR 2231’s restrictions on ballistic missile testing and development, as well as United Nations-imposed and internationally binding arms export and import embargoes;

Whereas UNSCR 2231 includes a formal mechanism for a participant state of the JCPOA, if it believes there has been significant non-performance of commitments under the JCPOA by Iran, to trigger a process that would require the UNSC to “snapback” all United Nation sanctions on Iran that has been lifted pursuant to UNSCR 2231;

Whereas, on September 14, 2024, in a joint statement, the United States and United Kingdom acknowledged publicly that Iran’s nuclear program “has never been more advanced and posed a clear threat to regional and global peace and security”;

Whereas, in June and November of 2024, in efforts led by France, Germany, the United Kingdom (E3), and the United States, the IAEA’s Board of Governors voted to censure Iran for non-compliance with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968 (commonly referred to as the “Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty” or “NPT”);

Whereas, on December 9, 2024, the E3 sent a letter to the United Nations Security Council stating, “We reiterate our determination to use all diplomatic tools to prevent

Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, including using snapback if necessary.”;

Whereas, on January 6, 2025, President of France Emmanuel Macron said the acceleration of Iran’s nuclear program was “bringing us very close to the breaking point” and said, “We will have to ask ourselves whether to use the mechanism for re-establishing sanctions. We are ready to do so if the question arises.”;

Whereas, on January 23, 2025, the Director General of the IAEA, Rafael Grossi, said that Iran has increased production of 60 percent enriched uranium from 7 kilograms to over 30 kilograms per month, and currently possess about 200 kilograms, which if enriched to 90 percent would amount to at least 5 nuclear weapons; and

Whereas, under UNSCR 2231, the resolution, including the “snapback” mechanism, terminates 10 years after Adoption Day for the JCPOA, which will be October 18, 2025: Now, therefore, be it

1 *Resolved*, That the House of Representatives—

2 (1) recognizes that Iran’s possession of a nu-
3 clear weapon would threaten not only the security of
4 the United States, but global security at large, in-
5 cluding United States allies and partners in Europe
6 and the Middle East;

7 (2) condemns the Government of Iran’s flagrant
8 and repeated violations of commitments it made
9 under the JCPOA and its international obligations
10 under UNSCR 2231;

1 (3) condemns the Russian Federation and the
2 People’s Republic of China, who remain participants
3 in the JCPOA, for their role in supporting Iran’s
4 malign activities;

5 (4) reaffirms that the United States Govern-
6 ment maintains the right to take any necessary
7 measures to prevent the Government of Iran from
8 acquiring nuclear weapons;

9 (5) supports the imposition and enforcement of
10 robust sanctions on Iran for its nuclear and missile
11 programs and on entities and individuals involved in
12 these programs to deter further proliferation efforts;
13 and

14 (6) urges the E3 to invoke the “snapback” of
15 United Nations sanctions against Iran under
16 UNSCR 2231 as soon as possible before the option
17 expires on October 18, 2025.

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