

119TH CONGRESS
2^D SESSION

H. R. 9042

To promote the development, production, and deployment of secure and resilient Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) to enhance United States national security and support the defense and resilience of Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MAY 26, 2026

Mr. VINDMAN (for himself, Mr. LAWLER, and Ms. DEAN of Pennsylvania) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

A BILL

To promote the development, production, and deployment of secure and resilient Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) to enhance United States national security and support the defense and resilience of Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Blue Skies for Taiwan
5 Act of 2026”.

6 **SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.**

7 In this Act:

1 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
2 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
3 mittees” means—

4 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations,
5 the Committee on Armed Services, the Com-
6 mittee on the Budget, and the Committee on
7 Appropriations of the Senate; and

8 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
9 Committee on Armed Services, the Committee
10 on the Budget, and the Committee on Appro-
11 priations of the House of Representatives.

12 (2) BLUE UAS.—The term “Blue UAS” refers
13 to UAS components and systems that comply with
14 Defense Contract Management Agency’s Blue UAS
15 program and its associated list.

16 **SEC. 3. FINDINGS.**

17 Congress makes the following findings:

18 (1) Taiwan is a longstanding and vital demo-
19 cratic partner whose security is central to United
20 States strategic interests and regional stability in
21 the Indo-Pacific region.

22 (2) The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is
23 increasingly employing gray-zone tactics, including
24 routine use of unmanned aerial systems and other

1 low-cost platforms, to pressure Taiwan and under-
2 mine its security.

3 (3) As set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act of
4 1979 (Public Law 96–8), it is United States policy
5 to maintain its capacity to resist any resort to force
6 or other forms of coercion against Taiwan and pro-
7 vide Taiwan with arms of a defensive nature.

8 (4) As set forth in the Taiwan Enhanced Resil-
9 ience Act (subtitle A of title XII of Public Law 117–
10 263), it is the sense of Congress that the United
11 States should support Taiwan’s acquisition and em-
12 ployment of capabilities that advance asymmetric
13 strategies.

14 (5) The vast majority of commercially available
15 UAS contain PRC-sourced components, creating sig-
16 nificant cybersecurity, supply chain, and operational
17 risks for both Taiwan and the United States.

18 (6) Taiwan is well-positioned to develop and
19 produce UAS components and systems but faces
20 challenges in competing with PRC commercial com-
21 panies, accessing capital, and meeting United States
22 certification and cybersecurity requirements.

23 (7) The United States should support UAS
24 supply chain development in Taiwan to strengthen
25 Taiwan’s asymmetric defense posture and expand

1 United States access to secure, PRC-independent
2 UAS components and systems.

3 (8) The Army Organic Industrial Base, includ-
4 ing its arsenals, depots, and ammunition plants, is
5 undergoing modernization to support emerging tech-
6 nologies and may provide opportunities to support
7 the testing and sustainment of unmanned aerial sys-
8 tems and related components in coordination with
9 allies and partners.

10 **SEC. 4. BLUE UAS WORKING GROUP.**

11 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 180 days after
12 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
13 State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall
14 establish a Blue UAS working group, leveraging existing
15 workstreams and expanding scope as needed, inclusive of
16 government, industry, and academic experts, to—

17 (1) assess Taiwan’s domestic drone production
18 capacity, including research and development, legal
19 and regulatory frameworks, testing, certification,
20 and production capacities for dual-use drones;

21 (2) evaluate opportunities for public-private
22 partnerships between the United States and Taiwan
23 for co-development and co-production of UAS sys-
24 tems and components, including pilot programs;

1 (3) identify barriers to the inclusion of Taiwan-
2 manufactured components and systems manufac-
3 tured in Blue UAS programs;

4 (4) identify regulatory, export-control, and cer-
5 tification barriers that impede Taiwan's partici-
6 pation in Blue UAS programs;

7 (5) provide recommendations to expand and im-
8 prove incorporation of Taiwanese suppliers into Blue
9 UAS programs;

10 (6) identify specific UAS components or sys-
11 tems that could be integrated into Blue UAS pro-
12 grams within 12 to 24 months;

13 (7) analyze opportunities and impediments to
14 including Taiwan in Replicator programs and similar
15 initiatives; and

16 (8) assess opportunities for collaboration with
17 the Army Organic Industrial Base, including its ar-
18 senals, depots, and ammunition plants, to support
19 the testing, evaluation, production, maintenance, and
20 sustainment of Blue UAS components and systems,
21 including those co-developed or co-produced with
22 Taiwan.

23 (b) REPORTING.—Not later than one year after the
24 date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter
25 for three years, the Working Group shall submit to the

1 appropriate congressional committees an unclassified re-
2 port on its activities, including findings, recommendations,
3 timelines, resource needs, and potential funding mecha-
4 nisms, with a classified appendix as necessary.

5 **SEC. 5. COOPERATIVE FRAMEWORK WITH ALLIES.**

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in coordi-
7 nation with the Secretary of Defense, shall establish a co-
8 operative framework, drawing on the Partnership for
9 Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience (PIPIR), among the
10 United States, Taiwan, and regional allies and global part-
11 ners to promote secure, PRC-independent UAS supply
12 chains and enhance interoperability.

13 (b) ELEMENTS.—The cooperative framework shall in-
14 clude—

15 (1) support regional allies in the acquisition of
16 Blue UAS components or systems from Taiwan in
17 lieu of PRC-sourced components; and

18 (2) fast-track Blue UAS certification for com-
19 ponents co-developed or co-produced by Taiwan and
20 regional allies.

21 **SEC. 6. FAST-TRACK CERTIFICATION.**

22 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in coordi-
23 nation with the Secretary of Defense, shall develop a fast-
24 track process for Blue UAS companies in Taiwan to ob-
25 tain Blue UAS certification.

1 (b) ELEMENTS.—The fast-track certification process
2 shall include the following procedures:

3 (1) Expedited export control reviews and licens-
4 ing for Taiwan drone and drone component manu-
5 facturers, including streamlined technical reviews for
6 components with no PRC-connected subcomponents.

7 (2) A fast-track certification procedure for Tai-
8 wanese manufacturers, including reciprocal testing
9 arrangements or recognition of equivalent Taiwan
10 cybersecurity standards where appropriate.

11 **SEC. 7. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**

12 There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such
13 sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of
14 this Act.

15 **SEC. 8. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.**

16 Nothing in this Act shall be construed—

17 (1) to alter United States policy towards Tai-
18 wan as codified in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979
19 (Public Law 96–8); and

20 (2) to alter the United States Government’s po-
21 sition with respect to the international status of Tai-
22 wan.

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