

119TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. R. 7645

To prohibit the use of United States-origin defense articles in the West Bank and Gaza unless certain conditions are met, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 23, 2026

Mr. CASTEN (for himself, Ms. DEAN of Pennsylvania, Ms. ESCOBAR, Mr. DELUZIO, Ms. BALINT, Mr. MCGOVERN, Ms. SCHAKOWSKY, Mr. KHANNA, Mr. GARAMENDI, Mr. BEYER, Ms. TOKUDA, Mr. DOGGETT, Mrs. FOUSHEE, Mr. THOMPSON of California, Ms. GARCIA of Texas, Ms. MATSUI, Mr. TRAN, Ms. RANDALL, Mr. HUFFMAN, Mr. TAKANO, Mr. CARTER of Louisiana, Ms. PINGREE, Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN, Ms. KAPTUR, Ms. MCCOLLUM, and Mr. CASTRO of Texas) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

A BILL

To prohibit the use of United States-origin defense articles in the West Bank and Gaza unless certain conditions are met, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Ceasefire Compliance
5 Act of 2026”.

1 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS; STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

2 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
3 ings:

4 (1) On October 7, 2023, Hamas conducted a
5 brutal and horrific attack against the people of
6 Israel, killing more than 1,200 people, the vast ma-
7 jority of whom were civilians, and took more than
8 250 individuals hostage.

9 (2) Following the attack, the United States as-
10 sisted directly with the defense of Israel, including
11 through defensive air capabilities, weapons, equip-
12 ment, and related assistance to counter and deter re-
13 gional threats, demonstrating the United States
14 commitment to Israel’s security.

15 (3) Hamas has been severely degraded mili-
16 tarily and currently lacks the ability to conduct a
17 sustained attack against Israel similar in scope to
18 October 7, but still maintains a presence in Gaza
19 and recruited new militants during the Israel-Hamas
20 war.

21 (4) The best path forward to make a weakened
22 Hamas no longer able to rule Gaza or threaten
23 Israel is by replacing it with an alternative security
24 and governance mechanism that benefits the civil-
25 ians of Gaza.

1 (5) Israel’s military operations in and policies
2 toward Gaza between October 2023 and February
3 2026 have killed over 70,000 Palestinians, a major-
4 ity of whom were civilians, and created an acute hu-
5 manitarian crisis, including famine in parts of the
6 territory in 2025.

7 (6) The United States helped negotiate a
8 ceasefire and hostage release agreement between
9 Israel and Hamas on October 10, 2025, that freed
10 the remaining hostages, provided much needed hu-
11 manitarian aid to Palestinians in Gaza, and laid the
12 groundwork for a broader regional peace through a
13 20-point plan.

14 (7) Violence and instability in the West Bank,
15 including settler violence, acts of de facto annex-
16 ation, such as the establishment of illegal outposts
17 and their retroactive legalization by the Israeli gov-
18 ernment, and broad threats of de jure annexation,
19 undermine the foreign policy objectives of the United
20 States, threaten to derail the ceasefire in Gaza, are
21 detrimental to Israel’s security, and harm prospects
22 for broader regional peace and a future Palestinian
23 state.

24 (8) Settler violence in the West Bank directed
25 against Palestinians, including attacks on civilians

1 and property destruction, reached record high levels
2 in 2025.

3 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
4 United States—

5 (1) to use all diplomatic tools to maintain the
6 October 10, 2025, ceasefire agreement and advance
7 the steps outlined in the 20-point plan to ensure se-
8 curity, freedom, and dignity for Israelis and Pal-
9 estinians alike;

10 (2) to affirm that sustained compliance by
11 Hamas with the October 10, 2025, ceasefire agree-
12 ment is essential, including by ceasing attacks, rear-
13 mament, and the rebuilding of military infrastruc-
14 ture, agreeing to a plan for step-by-step disar-
15 mament and refraining from conduct that under-
16 mines the ceasefire;

17 (3) to support the United Nations, ceasefire
18 mediators, and the broader international community
19 in fully implementing United Nations Security Coun-
20 cil Resolution 2803, and to oppose the use of the
21 Board of Peace to undermine or replace the role of
22 the United Nations in maintaining international
23 peace and security;

24 (4) to support an immediate and continued
25 surge in humanitarian assistance, provided by orga-

1 nizations that adhere to the core humanitarian prin-
2 ciples of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and
3 independence, as well as to ensure sufficient access
4 to aid within Gaza to alleviate the humanitarian cri-
5 sis in the Gaza Strip;

6 (5) to help facilitate credible and transparent
7 Palestinian governance and security institutions in
8 the Gaza Strip that can act as viable alternatives to
9 Hamas and lead to its disarmament;

10 (6) to bring about conditions for a viable nego-
11 tiated two-state solution and preclude activities that
12 harm such prospects, including the permanent reoc-
13 cupation of the Gaza Strip, forced displacement of
14 Palestinian civilians from Gaza, annexation of the
15 West Bank, or continued settler violence in the West
16 Bank;

17 (7) to help defend Israel against credible
18 threats of terrorism and military attacks, including
19 by mobilizing missile defense systems; and

20 (8) to ensure United States-origin defense arti-
21 cles are used in compliance with United States law.

22 **SEC. 3. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.**

23 Nothing in this Act may be construed to prevent the
24 United States from—

1 (1) defending against an attack on the United
2 States or its personnel or facilities in other coun-
3 tries;

4 (2) collecting, analyzing, or sharing intelligence,
5 including with Israel and other countries as appro-
6 priate; or

7 (3) assisting Israel and other countries—

8 (A) in taking defensive measures to protect
9 their territory from terrorist and other external
10 threats;

11 (B) in responding to contingencies that im-
12 pact regional security or stability; or

13 (C) by providing material for missile de-
14 fense articles and systems, including Iron
15 Dome, David's Sling, and Arrow 3 maintenance
16 and resupply.

17 **SEC. 4. PROHIBITION ON SALE, EXPORT, OR TRANSFER OF**
18 **UNITED STATES-ORIGIN DEFENSE ARTICLES**
19 **TO ISRAEL AND RESTRICTION ON PRE-**
20 **VIOUSLY PROVIDED ARTICLES.**

21 (a) REPORT.—

22 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after
23 the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 90
24 days thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordina-
25 tion with the Secretary of Defense and the Director

1 of National Intelligence, shall submit to the appro-
2 priate committees of Congress and make publicly
3 available a report that certifies that during the re-
4 porting period—

5 (A) the Government of Israel has not en-
6 gaged in military operations in the Gaza Strip
7 in violation of the ceasefire agreed to on Octo-
8 ber 10, 2025;

9 (B) the Government of Israel has engaged
10 constructively in negotiations to fully implement
11 the 20-point plan outlined in the October 10
12 agreement;

13 (C) the Government of Israel has ensured
14 unimpeded humanitarian aid is being sent to
15 and granted entry into the Gaza Strip, in quan-
16 tities sufficient to meet civilian humanitarian
17 needs and at a minimum consistent with those
18 of the January 19, 2025, agreement, including
19 by—

20 (i) predictably allowing the range of
21 necessary aid to enter, including diversi-
22 fied, nutrition-based foods; medicines; shel-
23 ter; and a combination of commercial
24 goods as well as humanitarian assistance;

1 (ii) granting necessary registrations,
2 visas, and other permissions to NGOs and
3 entities able to provide aid without exces-
4 sive burden;

5 (iii) ensuring safe passage for aid
6 workers through IDF controlled areas and
7 continued deconfliction; and

8 (iv) allowing rehabilitation of infra-
9 structure, rehabilitation of hospitals and
10 bakeries, and entry of necessary equipment
11 to remove debris, perform demining oper-
12 ations, and open roads;

13 (D) the Government of Israel has ensured
14 that—

15 (i) no civilians are forced to leave the
16 Gaza Strip against their will;

17 (ii) civilians who wish to leave the
18 Gaza Strip are free to do so; and

19 (iii) civilians who have left since Octo-
20 ber 7, 2023, or will leave the Gaza Strip
21 are free to return;

22 (E) the Government of Israel has ensured
23 that there will be no permanent occupation or
24 annexation of territory in the Gaza Strip;

1 (F) the Government of Israel has halted all
2 aerial and artillery bombardment and with-
3 drawn all Israeli Defense Forces to the agreed-
4 upon line, and that battle lines continue to re-
5 main frozen until conditions are met for the
6 complete staged withdrawal, in accordance with
7 the United States 20-point plan for Gaza an-
8 nounced on September 29, 2025;

9 (G) the Government of Israel has taken
10 verifiable steps to cooperate with Arab and
11 other international partners to allow a tem-
12 porary transitional government in the Gaza
13 Strip consisting of a technocratic, Palestinian
14 committee, responsible for delivering the day-to-
15 day running of public services and municipali-
16 ties for the people in Gaza and to ultimately en-
17 sure a pathway for a reformed Palestinian Au-
18 thority to assume the governance of the Gaza
19 Strip, in accordance with the United States 20-
20 point plan for Gaza announced on September
21 29, 2025;

22 (H) the Government of Israel has not
23 served as an impediment to the establishment
24 and deployment of a temporary International
25 Stabilization Force that will train and provide

1 support to Palestinian police forces in the Gaza
2 Strip, which will become the long-term internal
3 security solution in Gaza, in accordance with
4 the United States 20-point plan for Gaza an-
5 nounced on September 29, 2025;

6 (I) the Government of Israel has com-
7 mitted and continues to ensure that there will
8 be no de facto or de jure annexation of territory
9 in the West Bank; and

10 (J) the Government of Israel has taken
11 material steps to enforce the law in the West
12 Bank and prevent attacks by settlers on Pal-
13 estinians and has enforced procedures that pre-
14 vent IDF troops from escorting and enabling
15 settlers committing attacks.

16 (2) DEFINITION.—For purposes of paragraph
17 (1)(G), the phrase “has taken verifiable steps to co-
18 operate with Arab and other international partners
19 and allow a temporary transitional government in
20 the Gaza Strip consisting of a technocratic Pales-
21 tinian committee” means that the Secretary of
22 State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense
23 and the Director of National Intelligence, determines
24 and certifies that the Government of Israel has—

1 (A) taken affirmative steps within its con-
2 trol to facilitate the deployment and functioning
3 of such committee, including through the
4 issuance of necessary permits, provision of safe
5 passage, and facilitation of the movement into
6 and within the Gaza Strip of personnel, equip-
7 ment, and financial resources necessary for the
8 committee to perform its functions;

9 (B) refrained from actions that materially
10 obstruct, delay, or undermine the establishment
11 or operation of such committee, including the
12 arbitrary denial of access or the imposition of
13 conditions inconsistent with the 20-point plan
14 described in paragraph (1)(B); and

15 (C) not directly or indirectly financed, fa-
16 cilitated, or enabled any person or organization,
17 including through intermediaries, third-party
18 pass-throughs, or other covert or informal chan-
19 nels, for the purpose of materially obstructing,
20 delaying, undermining, or sabotaging the Octo-
21 ber 10, 2025, ceasefire, the 20-point plan, or
22 the establishment or operation of the transi-
23 tional governance and security arrangements
24 described in paragraphs (1)(G) and (H).

1 (b) DETERMINATION AS BASIS FOR CERTIFI-
2 CATION.—The certification in subsection (a) shall be
3 based on an interagency assessment led by the Secretary
4 of State and conducted in coordination with the Director
5 of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense re-
6 garding Israel’s progress toward meeting the conditions
7 described in subparagraphs (A) through (J) of subsection
8 (a)(1). In preparing the certification, the Secretary of
9 State shall consider all relevant information, including in-
10 telligence reporting and credible public reporting.

11 (c) FORM.—The reports required by subsection (a)
12 shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain
13 a classified annex.

14 (d) PROHIBITIONS.—

15 (1) IN GENERAL.—If the certification in sub-
16 section (a) concludes that the Government of Israel
17 is in violation of any of the conditions described in
18 subparagraphs (A) through (J) of subsection
19 (a)(1)—

20 (A) the United States shall not authorize
21 or permit the sale, export, or transfer of any
22 United States-origin defense articles to Israel,
23 provided through any source or existing author-
24 ity, for end use in the West Bank or Gaza;

1 (B) the sale, export, or transfer of any de-
2 fense article to Israel shall only take place pur-
3 suant to a Letter of Offer and Acceptance or
4 export license that requires that the Govern-
5 ment of Israel will not use such articles in the
6 West Bank or Gaza; and

7 (C) the Secretary of State, in coordination
8 with the Secretary of Defense and the Director
9 of National Intelligence, shall establish an
10 agreement with the Government of Israel that
11 any United States-origin defense articles sold,
12 exported, or transferred to Israel prior to the
13 date of the submission of the certification de-
14 scribed in subsection (a) are prohibited from
15 being used in the West Bank or Gaza.

16 (2) SUNSET.—The prohibitions in paragraph
17 (1) shall remain in effect until a certification in sub-
18 section (a) concludes that Israel has come into com-
19 pliance with all conditions described in subpara-
20 graphs (A) through (J) of subsection (a)(1).

21 (e) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
22 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
23 tees of Congress” means—

24 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
25 Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on

1 Appropriations, and the Permanent Select Com-
2 mittee on Intelligence of the House of Representa-
3 tives; and

4 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
5 Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
6 Appropriations, and the Select Committee on Intel-
7 ligence of the Senate.

8 **SEC. 5. END USE MONITORING GROUP.**

9 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—Immediately after the enact-
10 ment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination
11 with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National
12 Intelligence, shall take such steps as may be necessary to
13 establish an end use monitoring group that shall serve to
14 monitor whether United States-origin defense articles are
15 being used in the West Bank or Gaza.

16 (b) REPORT.—During such time as the prohibitions
17 described in section 4(d) are in force, the end use moni-
18 toring group established by subsection (a) shall submit to
19 the appropriate committees of Congress a report every 60
20 days that certifies whether Israel is using United States-
21 origin defense articles in the West Bank or Gaza.

22 (c) PROHIBITION.—

23 (1) IN GENERAL.—If the report in subsection

24 (b) concludes that Israel is using United States-ori-
25 gin defense articles in the West Bank or Gaza, then

1 the United States shall not authorize the sale, ex-
2 port, or transfer of any United States-origin defense
3 articles to Israel.

4 (2) WAIVER.—

5 (A) IN GENERAL.—The President may
6 waive the prohibition in paragraph (1) for a
7 specific sale, export, or transfer of defense arti-
8 cles to Israel only if the President—

9 (i) determines and certifies to the ap-
10 propriate congressional committees that
11 such waiver is vital to the national security
12 of the United States; and

13 (ii) not fewer than 15 days before au-
14 thorizing such sale, export, or transfer,
15 submits such certification, to—

16 (I) the chair and ranking minor-
17 ity member of the Committee on For-
18 eign Affairs of the House of Rep-
19 resentatives; and

20 (II) the chair and ranking minor-
21 ity member of the Committee on For-
22 eign Relations of the Senate.

23 (B) FORM.—A certification under this
24 paragraph shall be submitted in unclassified

1 form but may contain a classified annex, and
2 shall include—

3 (i) a detailed description of the na-
4 ture, quantity, and estimated value of the
5 defense articles to be transferred;

6 (ii) a description of the specific na-
7 tional security interests of the United
8 States that would be directly and materi-
9 ally advanced by the waiver; and

10 (iii) an explanation of why no feasible
11 alternative to the waiver exists to achieve
12 those interests.

13 (3) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this
14 subsection may be construed to limit the obligation
15 or expenditure of any funds appropriated for air de-
16 fense systems, including Iron Dome, David’s Sling,
17 and Arrow 3 systems.

18 (4) SUNSET.—The prohibition in paragraph (1)
19 shall remain in effect until a certification in sub-
20 section (b) concludes that Israel is not using United
21 States-origin defense articles in the West Bank or
22 Gaza.

23 (d) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
24 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
25 tees of Congress” means—

1 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
2 Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent
3 Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
4 Representatives; and

5 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
6 Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Com-
7 mittee on Intelligence of the Senate.

8 **SEC. 6. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION RELATING TO THE**
9 **BOARD OF PEACE.**

10 (a) **LIMITATION ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND OPER-**
11 **ATING SUPPORT.**—Nothing in this Act, the October 10,
12 2025, ceasefire agreement, the 20-point plan, or any re-
13 lated framework may be construed to authorize the obliga-
14 tion or expenditure of funds by, for, or on behalf of the
15 Board of Peace for its administrative expenses, operating
16 costs, or personnel support, or to authorize any Federal
17 department or agency to obligate or expend funds for such
18 administrative expenses, operating costs, or personnel sup-
19 port, except as expressly authorized by an Act of Congress
20 and provided in advance in an appropriations Act.

21 (b) **NO DISPLACEMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS OR**
22 **OTHER AUTHORITIES.**—Nothing in this Act, the October
23 10, 2025, ceasefire agreement, the 20-point plan, or any
24 related framework may be construed to grant the Board
25 of Peace authority that supersedes the role or authorities

1 of the United Nations under the Charter of the United
2 Nations or otherwise supersedes any applicable provision
3 of United States or international law.

4 (c) PRESERVATION OF ASSISTANCE FOR GAZA.—
5 Nothing in this Act may be construed to limit the obliga-
6 tion or expenditure of funds for humanitarian assistance,
7 stabilization, reconstruction, or other assistance for Gaza
8 that is otherwise authorized by law and provided in an
9 appropriations Act.

10 **SEC. 7. TERMINATION.**

11 The authorities provided by this Act shall cease to
12 have effect on the date that is 5 years after the date of
13 the enactment of this Act.

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