

119TH CONGRESS  
1ST SESSION

# H. R. 6058

To provide for multilateral semiconductor technology supply chain coordination, and for other purposes.

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IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NOVEMBER 17, 2025

Mr. HUIZENGA (for himself, Mr. MOYLAN, and Mr. CRENSHAW) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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## A BILL

To provide for multilateral semiconductor technology supply chain coordination, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Semiconductor Tech-  
5 nology Resilience, Integrity, and Defense Enhancement  
6 Act” or the “STRIDE Act”.

7 **SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

8 It is the sense of Congress that—

9 (1) the global semiconductor technology supply  
10 chain is critical to United States and allied national

1 security, economic competitiveness, and technological  
2 leadership;

3 (2) the Chinese Communist Party is pursuing  
4 strategies to dominate the semiconductor technology  
5 industry to assist in its military modernization ef-  
6 forts and human rights abuses through non-market  
7 practices, export control violation and avoidance,  
8 economic espionage, military-civil fusion, and preda-  
9 tory investment;

10 (3) the integrity of the global semiconductor  
11 technology supply chain requires coordinated action  
12 with allied and partner nations to prevent techno-  
13 logical capture by the Chinese Communist Party and  
14 other foreign adversaries;

15 (4) unilateral export controls for protecting crit-  
16 ical semiconductor technologies can be amplified  
17 with multilateral coordination; and

18 (5) fully utilizing certain unilateral United  
19 States export control authorities, including the For-  
20 eign Direct Product Rule, has proven effective at  
21 preventing circumvention or avoidance of United  
22 States export controls through third-country produc-  
23 tion.

24 **SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

25 It is the policy of the United States to—

1           (1) maintain United States and allied partner  
2 technological leadership in semiconductor technology  
3 research, design, manufacturing, and advanced ma-  
4 terials;

5           (2) prevent adversarial capture of key  
6 chokepoints in the global semiconductor technology  
7 supply chain;

8           (3) coordinate with allied and partner nations  
9 to expand and enhance semiconductor technology  
10 protection;

11           (4) ensure that United States-origin technology  
12 and intellectual property, including the direct prod-  
13 ucts of United States-origin technology, do not con-  
14 tribute to the Chinese Communist Party’s military  
15 modernization, human rights abuses, and pursuit of  
16 technological dominance over the United States and  
17 its allies and partners; and

18           (5) promote resilient, secure, and trusted semi-  
19 conductor supply chains among United States allies  
20 and partners.

21 **SEC. 4. MULTILATERAL SEMICONDUCTOR TECHNOLOGY**

22 **SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATION.**

23           (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall co-  
24 ordinate with governments of countries that maintain sig-  
25 nificant capabilities in semiconductor technology research,

1 design, manufacturing, materials, equipment, or equip-  
2 ment subsystems and components to establish coordinated  
3 and expanded approaches for protecting critical semicon-  
4 ductor technologies from acquisition by the Chinese Com-  
5 munist Party and other foreign adversaries of the United  
6 States and its allies and partners.

7 (b) COORDINATION OBJECTIVES.—In carrying out  
8 subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall seek to  
9 achieve—

10 (1) alignment of export control policies regard-  
11 ing semiconductor technology manufacturing equip-  
12 ment, including lithography systems, deposition  
13 equipment, etching tools, thermocompression bond-  
14 ing equipment, resist processing tools, chemical me-  
15 chanical planarization tools, cleaning tools, handling  
16 tools, assembly, packaging, and test tools, and in-  
17 spection systems and the critical subcomponents  
18 needed to produce such equipment;

19 (2) expanded restrictions on semiconductor  
20 technology design tools, intellectual property trans-  
21 fers, equipment servicing, and technical assistance  
22 that could enable indigenous semiconductor tech-  
23 nology development capabilities in countries of con-  
24 cern;

1           (3) harmonized approaches to controlling dual-  
2 use semiconductor technology materials, including  
3 photoresists, specialty gases, and advanced sub-  
4 strates;

5           (4) joint monitoring, enforcement, and adminis-  
6 tration mechanisms to prevent circumvention of  
7 semiconductor technology controls through third-  
8 country entities as well as prevent foreign backfilling  
9 of restricted items;

10           (5) information sharing regarding semicon-  
11 ductor technology transfer risks, end-user  
12 verification, and supply chain security threats; and

13           (6) establishment of trusted supplier networks  
14 for critical semiconductor technology components  
15 and manufacturing services.

16 (c) CONSEQUENCES FOR NON-COOPERATION.—

17           (1) ASSESSMENT OF COOPERATION.—The Sec-  
18 retary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of  
19 Commerce, shall regularly assess the extent to which  
20 countries engaged pursuant to subsection (a) are im-  
21 plementing measures consistent with United States  
22 policy described in section 3.

23           (2) DETERMINATION OF INSUFFICIENT SECU-  
24 RITY MEASURES.—If the Secretary of State deter-  
25 mines that a country engaged with pursuant to sub-

1 section (a) is not implementing security measures  
2 sufficient to fully prevent semiconductor technology  
3 transfer to countries of concern, the Secretary  
4 shall—

5 (A) provide a detailed explanation of the  
6 specific deficiencies in the country’s semicon-  
7 ductor technology protection measures;

8 (B) request the Secretary of Commerce to  
9 convene a meeting of the Export Advisory Re-  
10 view Board to identify and execute a plan of ac-  
11 tion to address the insufficient security meas-  
12 ures within 21 days of the Secretary of State’s  
13 determination of inadequate cooperation; and

14 (C) notify the appropriate congressional  
15 committees of such determination not later than  
16 30 days after making such determination and  
17 provide routine updates on the Export Advisory  
18 Review Board meeting request and plan of ac-  
19 tion described in subparagraph (B).

20 (3) ENHANCED FOREIGN DIRECT PRODUCT  
21 RULE APPLICATION.—In carrying out the process  
22 described in paragraph (2)(B), the Secretary of  
23 State shall provide to Export Advisory Review  
24 Board—

1 (A) recommendations for the application of  
2 Foreign Direct Product Rule restrictions to  
3 semiconductor technology produced in the non-  
4 cooperating country that incorporate United  
5 States-origin technology, software, or equip-  
6 ment;

7 (B) recommended entities for the expan-  
8 sion of Entity List designations for semicon-  
9 ductor technology supply chain companies or re-  
10 search institutions in the non-cooperating coun-  
11 try that pose technology transfer risks; and

12 (C) guidance on what additional steps may  
13 be needed to prevent foreign backfilling of U.S.  
14 technology in restricted sectors or entities in  
15 countries of concern.

16 (d) REPORTS.—

17 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after  
18 the date of enactment of this Act, and every 90 days  
19 thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the  
20 appropriate congressional committees a report on—

21 (A) the status of diplomatic engagement  
22 with key semiconductor technology-producing  
23 countries;

24 (B) progress toward achieving the coordi-  
25 nation objectives specified in subsection (b);

1 (C) any determinations of inadequate co-  
2 operation made under subsection (c); and

3 (D) the effectiveness of multilateral coordi-  
4 nation in preventing semiconductor technology  
5 transfer to countries of concern.

6 (2) FORM.—The report required by this sub-  
7 section shall be submitted in unclassified form but  
8 may include a classified annex.

9 (e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

10 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-  
11 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-  
12 mittees” means—

13 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of  
14 the House of Representatives; and

15 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations  
16 and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and  
17 Urban Affairs of the Senate.

18 (2) COUNTRIES OF CONCERN.—The term  
19 “countries of concern” has the meaning given the  
20 term “covered nation” in section 4872(f) of title 10,  
21 United States Code.

22 (3) ENTITY LIST.—The term “Entity List”  
23 means the list maintained by the Bureau of Industry  
24 and Security of the Department of Commerce and  
25 set forth in Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of title

1 15, Code of Federal Regulations, or successor regu-  
2 lations.

3 (4) FOREIGN DIRECT PRODUCT RULE.—The  
4 term “Foreign Direct Product Rule” means the rule  
5 exercising United States export controls on an item  
6 produced in a foreign country for shipment or trans-  
7 mission to another foreign country or foreign person,  
8 if the item—

9 (A) is produced using technology or soft-  
10 ware that is otherwise subject to the jurisdic-  
11 tion of the United States;

12 (B) is produced with the use of a plant or  
13 major component of a plant that—

14 (i) is located outside the United  
15 States; and

16 (ii) has been created using the tech-  
17 nology or software described in subpara-  
18 graph (A); or

19 (C) contains, is commingled with, is bun-  
20 dled with, is drawn from, or is produced by an  
21 item described in subparagraph (A) or (B).

22 (5) SEMICONDUCTOR TECHNOLOGY.—The term  
23 “semiconductor technology” includes—

24 (A) integrated circuits, microprocessors,  
25 and memory devices;

1           (B) semiconductor manufacturing equip-  
2           ment and tools, including subsystems and com-  
3           ponents;

4           (C) semiconductor design software and in-  
5           tellectual property;

6           (D) semiconductor materials and specialty  
7           chemicals;

8           (E) testing, assembly, and packaging  
9           equipment; and

10          (F) any technology, component, or service  
11          that is essential to semiconductor design, manu-  
12          facturing, or testing processes.

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