

119TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 5912

To require the executive branch to develop a whole-of-government strategy to disrupt growing cooperation among the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which are the foremost adversaries of the United States, and mitigate the risks posed to the United States.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NOVEMBER 4, 2025

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHY (for himself and Mr. MOYLAN) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Armed Services, and Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To require the executive branch to develop a whole-of-government strategy to disrupt growing cooperation among the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which are the foremost adversaries of the United States, and mitigate the risks posed to the United States.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

1 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

2 This Act may be cited as the “Defending Inter-
3 national Security by Restricting Unacceptable Partner-
4 ships and Tactics Act” or “DISRUPT Act”.

5 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

6 Congress makes the following findings:

7 (1) The People’s Republic of China, the Rus-
8 sian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and
9 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are each
10 considered—

11 (A) a foreign adversary (as defined in sec-
12 tion 825(d) of the National Defense Authoriza-
13 tion Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law
14 118–31; 137 Stat. 322; 46 U.S.C. 50309
15 note));

16 (B) a country of risk (as defined in section
17 6432(a) of the Servicemember Quality of Life
18 Improvement and National Defense Authoriza-
19 tion Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law
20 118–159; 138 Stat. 2488; 42 U.S.C. 7144b
21 note)) for purposes of assessing counterintel-
22 ligence risks posed by certain visitors to Na-
23 tional Laboratories;

24 (C) a foreign country of concern (as de-
25 fined in section 10612(a) of the Research and
26 Development, Competition, and Innovation Act

1 (Public Law 117–167; 136 Stat. 1635; 42
2 U.S.C. 19221 note));

3 (D) a covered foreign country (as defined
4 in section 164 of the Servicemember Quality of
5 Life Improvement and National Defense Au-
6 thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public
7 Law 118159; 138 Stat. 1818; 10 U.S.C. 4651
8 note prec.)) for purposes of a prohibition on op-
9 eration, procurement, and contracting relating
10 to foreign-made light detection and ranging
11 technology; and

12 (E) a covered foreign country (as defined
13 in section 1622 of the National Defense Au-
14 thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public
15 Law 11781; 135 Stat. 2086; 10 U.S.C. 421
16 note prec.)) for purposes of a strategy and plan
17 to implement certain defense intelligence re-
18 forms.

19 (2) According to the 2025 Intelligence Commu-
20 nity Annual Threat Assessment, the United States
21 faces an increasingly contested and dangerous global
22 landscape as the four adversaries named in para-
23 graph (1) deepen cooperation in a manner that—

24 (A) reinforces threats posed by each such
25 adversary individually; and

1 (B) poses new challenges to the strength
2 and power of the United States globally.

3 (3) Much of the cooperation referred to in para-
4 graph (2) is occurring bilaterally, as the People’s
5 Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Is-
6 lamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People’s
7 Republic of Korea strengthen diplomatic, economic,
8 and military ties in accordance with bilateral agree-
9 ments, which include—

10 (A) the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation
11 and Mutual Assistance between China and the
12 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, signed
13 at Beijing July 11, 1961;

14 (B) the Joint Statement on Comprehensive
15 Strategic Partnership between the Islamic Re-
16 public of Iran and the People’s Republic of
17 China, issued on March 27, 2021;

18 (C) the Joint Statement of the Russian
19 Federation and the People’s Republic of China
20 on International Relations Entering a New Era
21 and Global Sustainable Development, issued on
22 February 4, 2022;

23 (D) the Treaty on Comprehensive Stra-
24 tegic Partnership between the Russian Federa-

1 tion and the Democratic People’s Republic of
2 Korea, signed at Pyongyang June 18, 2024;

3 (E) the Iranian-Russian Treaty on Com-
4 prehensive Strategic Partnership, signed at
5 Moscow January 17, 2025; and

6 (F) traditional relations of friendship and
7 cooperation between the Islamic Republic of
8 Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of
9 Korea.

10 (4) The most concerning forms of such coopera-
11 tion with respect to the interests of the United
12 States occur bilaterally in the realm of defense co-
13 operation. Examples include the following:

14 (A) TRANSFER AND SHARING OF WEAPONS
15 AND MUNITIONS.—Since 2022, the Islamic Re-
16 public of Iran has supplied the Russian Federa-
17 tion with drones and ballistic missiles, and the
18 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has pro-
19 vided artillery ammunition and ballistic mis-
20 siles. Likewise, the Russian Federation has
21 agreed to provide the Islamic Republic of Iran
22 with Su–35 fighter jets and air defense assist-
23 ance.

24 (B) TRANSFER AND SHARING OF DUAL-
25 USE TECHNOLOGIES AND CAPABILITIES.—Dual-

1 use goods supplied by the People’s Republic of
2 China have enabled the Russian Federation to
3 continue defense production in the face of wide-
4 ranging sanctions and export controls intended
5 to prevent the Russian Federation from access-
6 ing the necessary components to fuel its defense
7 industry. In turn, reporting indicates that the
8 Russian Federation has provided technical ex-
9 pertise on satellite technology to the Democratic
10 People’s Republic of Korea and is working
11 closely with the People’s Republic of China on
12 air defense and submarine technology.

13 (C) JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND EX-
14 ERCISES.—The military forces of the Demo-
15 cratic People’s Republic of Korea are actively
16 participating in the Russian Federation’s inva-
17 sion of Ukraine, and joint military exercises be-
18 tween the People’s Republic of China and the
19 Russian Federation are expanding in scope,
20 scale, and geographic reach, including in close
21 proximity to territory of the United States.

22 (D) COORDINATION.—Coordination on
23 disinformation and cyber operations, including
24 coordinated messaging aimed at denigrating
25 and isolating the United States internationally.

1 (5) Adversaries of the United States are also
2 cooperating in a manner that may circumvent
3 United States and multilateral economic tools. Ex-
4 amples include the following:

5 (A) The continued purchase by the Peo-
6 ple’s Republic of China of oil from the Islamic
7 Republic of Iran despite sanctions imposed by
8 the Treasury of the United States on oil from
9 the Islamic Republic of Iran.

10 (B) The veto by the Russian Federation
11 of, and abstention by the People’s Republic of
12 China in a vote on, a United Nations Security
13 Council resolution relating to monitoring United
14 Nations Security Council-leveled sanctions on the
15 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

16 (6) Adversaries of the United States are cooper-
17 ating multilaterally in international institutions such
18 as the United Nations and through expanded multi-
19 lateral groupings, such as the Brazil-Russia-India-
20 China-South Africa group (commonly known as
21 “BRICS”), to isolate and erode the influence of the
22 United States.

23 (7) Such increased cooperation and alignment
24 among the People’s Republic of China, the Russian
25 Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the

1 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, to an un-
2 precedented extent, poses a significant threat to
3 United States interests and national security.

4 (8) Such increasing alignment—

5 (A) allows each such adversary to mod-
6 ernize its military more quickly than previously
7 anticipated;

8 (B) enables unforeseen breakthroughs in
9 capabilities through the sharing among such ad-
10 versaries of critical military technologies, which
11 could erode the technological edge of the United
12 States Armed Forces;

13 (C) presents increasing challenges to strat-
14 egies of isolation or containment against such
15 individual adversaries, since the People’s Re-
16 public of China, the Russian Federation, the Is-
17 lamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic
18 People’s Republic of Korea now provide critical
19 lifelines to each other;

20 (D) threatens the effectiveness of United
21 States economic tools, as such adversaries co-
22 operate to evade United States sanctions and
23 export controls and seek to establish alternative
24 payment mechanisms that do not require trans-
25 actions in United States dollars; and

1 (E) increases the chances of United States
2 conflict or tensions with any one of such adver-
3 saries drawing in another, thereby posing a
4 greater risk that the United States will have to
5 contend with simultaneous threats from such
6 adversaries in one or more theaters.

7 **SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

8 It is the policy of the United States—

9 (1) to disrupt or frustrate the most dangerous
10 aspects of cooperation between and among the Peo-
11 ple’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the
12 Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic Peo-
13 ple’s Republic of Korea, including by using the
14 threat of sanctions and export controls, bringing
15 such cooperation to light, and sharing information
16 with United States allies and partners who may—

17 (A) share the concerns and objectives of
18 the United States; and

19 (B) have influence over such adversaries;

20 (2) to constrain such grouping from expanding
21 its footprint or capabilities across the world; and

22 (3) to prepare for the increasing likelihood that
23 the United States could face simultaneous challenges
24 or conflict with multiple such adversaries in multiple

1 theaters, including by bolstering deterrence across
2 all priority theaters.

3 **SEC. 4. TASK FORCES AND REPORTS.**

4 (a) **TASK FORCES ON ADVERSARY ALIGNMENT.**—

5 (1) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 60 days after
6 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
7 of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of
8 the Treasury, and the Secretary of Commerce shall
9 each—

10 (A) establish a task force on adversary
11 alignment; and

12 (B) designate a point of contact on adver-
13 sary alignment, who shall serve as the head of
14 the task force for the applicable department, of-
15 fice, or agency.

16 (2) **REQUIREMENTS.**—Each task force estab-
17 lished pursuant to paragraph (1) shall—

18 (A) comprise—

19 (i) subject matter experts covering
20 each of—

21 (I) the People’s Republic of
22 China;

23 (II) the Russian Federation;

24 (III) the Islamic Republic of
25 Iran; and

1 (IV) the Democratic People's Re-
2 public of Korea;

3 (ii) representatives covering all core
4 functions of the department, office, or
5 agency of the Secretary or Director estab-
6 lishing the task force; and

7 (iii) a mix of analysts, operators, and
8 senior management;

9 (B) ensure that the task force members
10 have the requisite security clearances and ac-
11 cess to critical compartmented information
12 streams necessary to assess and understand the
13 full scope of adversary cooperation, including
14 how events in one theater might trigger actions
15 in another; and

16 (C) not later than 180 days after the date
17 of the enactment of this Act, submit to the Sec-
18 retary or Director who established the task
19 force, and to the appropriate committees of
20 Congress, a report—

21 (i) evaluating the impact of adversary
22 alignment on the relevant operations car-
23 ried out by the individual department, of-
24 fice, or agency of the task force; and

1 (ii) putting forth recommendations for
2 such organizational changes as the task
3 force considers necessary to ensure the de-
4 partment, office, or agency of the task
5 force is well positioned to routinely evalu-
6 ate and respond to the rapidly evolving na-
7 ture of adversary cooperation and the at-
8 tendant risks.

9 (3) QUARTERLY INTERAGENCY MEETING.—Not
10 less frequently than quarterly, the heads of the task
11 forces established under this section shall meet to
12 discuss findings, problems, and next steps with re-
13 spect to adversary alignment.

14 (b) REPORT ON NATURE, TRAJECTORY, AND RISKS
15 OF BILATERAL COOPERATION BETWEEN, AND MULTILAT-
16 ERAL COOPERATION AMONG, ADVERSARIES OF THE
17 UNITED STATES.—

18 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after
19 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director
20 of National Intelligence, in coordination with the
21 head of any Federal agency the Director considers
22 appropriate, shall submit to the President, any Fed-
23 eral officer of Cabinet-level rank the Director con-
24 siders appropriate, and the appropriate committees
25 of Congress, a report on bilateral and multilateral

1 cooperation among adversaries of the United States
2 and the resulting risks of such cooperation.

3 (2) ELEMENTS.—The report required by para-
4 graph (1) shall include the following:

5 (A) A description of the current nature
6 and extent of bilateral or multilateral coopera-
7 tion among the People’s Republic of China, the
8 Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of
9 Iran, and the Democratic People’s Republic of
10 Korea across the diplomatic, information, mili-
11 tary, and economic spheres, and an assessment
12 of the advantages that accrue to each adversary
13 from such cooperation.

14 (B) An assessment of the trajectory for co-
15 operation among the adversaries described in
16 subparagraph (A) during the 5-year period be-
17 ginning on the date on which the report is sub-
18 mitted.

19 (C) An outline of the risks to the United
20 States and allied diplomatic, military, intel-
21 ligence, and economic operations, and broader
22 security interests around the world, including
23 the following:

24 (i) The risk of technology transfers
25 dramatically increasing the military capa-

1 bilities of adversaries of the United States
2 and the impact on the relative balance of
3 United States and allied capabilities as
4 compared to that of the adversary.

5 (ii) The risk posed to the United
6 States by efforts made by adversaries to
7 establish alternate payment systems, in
8 particular with respect to the dominance of
9 the United States dollar and the effective-
10 ness of United States sanctions and export
11 control tools.

12 (iii) The risk that an adversary of the
13 United States might assist or otherwise en-
14 able another adversary of the United
15 States in the event that one or more adver-
16 saries become party to a conflict with the
17 United States.

18 (iv) The risk that adversary coopera-
19 tion poses a growing threat to United
20 States intelligence collection efforts.

21 (D) An evaluation of the vulnerabilities
22 and tension points within such adversary bilat-
23 eral or multilateral relationships, and an assess-
24 ment of the likely effect of efforts by the United
25 States to separate adversaries.

1 (3) USE OF OTHER REPORTING.—The report
2 required by paragraph (1) may be completed using
3 reports submitted by the Director of National Intel-
4 ligence to satisfy other statutory requirements.

5 (4) FORM.—The report submitted required by
6 paragraph (1) shall be submitted in classified form.

7 (c) REPORT ON STRATEGIC APPROACH.—

8 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
9 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
10 retary of State and the Secretary of Defense, in con-
11 sultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the
12 Secretary of Commerce, and the Director of Na-
13 tional Intelligence, shall submit to the appropriate
14 committees of Congress a report outlining the stra-
15 tegic approach of the United States to adversary
16 alignment and the necessary steps to disrupt, frus-
17 trate, constrain, and prepare for adversary coopera-
18 tion during the two-year period beginning on the
19 date of the enactment of this Act.

20 (2) ELEMENTS.—The report required by para-
21 graph (1) shall include the following:

22 (A) A detailed description of the methods
23 and tools available to the United States to dis-
24 rupt the most dangerous elements of adversary
25 cooperation, including the growing connectivity

1 between the defense industrial bases of each ad-
2 versary.

3 (B) A timeline for using diplomatic en-
4 gagement, intelligence diplomacy, security co-
5 operation, and foreign assistance, as appro-
6 priate—

7 (i) to educate allies and partners
8 about the increasing risk of adversary
9 alignment;

10 (ii) to secure the support of allies and
11 partners in combating adversary align-
12 ment; and

13 (iii) to assess and help address, as ap-
14 propriate, the vulnerabilities and capability
15 gaps of allies and partners to counter
16 threats from adversary alignment.

17 (C) A plan for ensuring the integrity of
18 United States methods of economic statecraft,
19 including an assessment of the efficiency of the
20 United States sanctions and export control en-
21 forcement apparatus and any accompanying
22 resourcing requirements.

23 (D) A clear plan to bolster deterrence
24 within the priority theaters of the Indo-Pacific
25 region, Europe, and the Middle East by—

1 (i) increasing United States and allied
2 munitions stockpiles, particularly such
3 stockpiles that are most critical for sup-
4 porting frontline partners such as Israel,
5 Taiwan, and Ukraine in the event of ag-
6 gression by a United States adversary;

7 (ii) facilitating collaborative efforts
8 with allies for the co-production, co-main-
9 tenance, and co-sustainment of critical mu-
10 nitions and platforms required by the
11 United States and allies and partners of
12 the United States in the event of a future
13 conflict with the People's Republic of
14 China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic
15 Republic of Iran, or the Democratic Peo-
16 ple's Republic of Korea; and

17 (iii) more effectively using funding
18 through the United States Foreign Mili-
19 tary Financing program to support allied
20 and partner domestic defense production
21 that can contribute to deterrence in each
22 such priority theater.

23 (E) A plan for digitizing and updating
24 war-planning tools of the Department of De-
25 fense not later than 1 year after the date on

1 which the report is submitted to ensure that
2 United States war planners are better equipped
3 to update and modify war plans in the face of
4 rapidly evolving information on adversary co-
5 operation.

6 (F) An assessment of the capability gaps
7 and vulnerabilities the United States would face
8 in deterring an adversary in the event that the
9 United States is engaged in a conflict with an-
10 other adversary, and a plan to work with allies
11 and partners to address such gaps and
12 vulnerabilities.

13 (3) FORM.—The report required by paragraph
14 (1) shall be submitted in classified form.

15 (d) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
16 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
17 tees of Congress” means—

18 (1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Se-
19 lect Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on
20 Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropria-
21 tions, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
22 Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Commerce,
23 Science, and Transportation of the Senate; and

24 (2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Per-
25 manent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Com-

1 mittee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appro-
2 priations, the Committee on Financial Services, and
3 the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the
4 House of Representatives.

○