

119TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 4458

To require the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to develop a strategy in response to the global basing intentions of the People's Republic of China.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JULY 16, 2025

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHY (for himself and Mr. LAHOOD) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To require the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to develop a strategy in response to the global basing intentions of the People's Republic of China.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLES.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Combating PRC Over-
5 seas and Unlawful Networked Threats through Enhanced
6 Resilience Act of 2025” or the “COUNTER Act of 2025”.

1 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

2 According to multiple sources, including the 2024 an-
3 nual report to Congress, titled “Military and Security De-
4 velopments Involving the People’s Republic of China” and
5 known informally as the “China Military Power Report”—

6 (1) the PRC is seeking to expand its overseas
7 logistics and basing infrastructure to allow the PLA
8 to project and sustain military power at greater dis-
9 tances;

10 (2) a global PLA logistics network could give
11 the PRC increased capabilities to surveil or disrupt
12 United States military operations;

13 (3) in August 2017, the PRC officially opened
14 the first overseas PLA military base near the com-
15 mercial port of Doraleh in Djibouti;

16 (4) in 2019, the PRC also attempted to acquire
17 strategically important port infrastructure at Subic
18 Bay in the Philippines, but was stopped by the Gov-
19 ernment of the United States, the Philippines, and
20 Japan, and by private investors;

21 (5) in April 2025, officials from the PRC and
22 Cambodia officially inaugurated the China-Cambodia
23 Ream Naval Base Joint Support and Training Cen-
24 ter and celebrated the expansion of port facilities at
25 Ream Naval Base, some of which appear to have
26 been reserved for the use of PRC ships that have

1 been continuously stationed at Ream Naval Base
2 since December 2023; and

3 (6) in addition to the base in Djibouti and the
4 PRC's access to the port at the Ream Naval Base
5 in Cambodia, the PRC is likely pursuing access to
6 additional military facilities to support naval, air,
7 and ground forces projection in many countries.

8 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

9 While the executive branch has undertaken case-by-
10 case efforts to forestall the establishment of new PRC per-
11 manent military presence in several countries, it is the
12 sense of Congress that future efforts to counter the PRC's
13 global basing intentions must—

14 (1) proceed with the urgency required to ad-
15 dress the strategic implications of the PRC's actions;

16 (2) reflect sufficient interagency coordination
17 with respect to a problem that necessitates a whole-
18 of-government approach;

19 (3) ensure that the United States Government
20 maintains a proactive posture rather than a reactive
21 posture in order to maximize strategic decision
22 space;

23 (4) identify a comprehensive menu of actions
24 that would be influential in shaping a partner's deci-

1 sion making regarding giving the PRC military ac-
2 cess to its sovereign territory;

3 (5) appropriately prioritize the subject of the
4 PRC's global basing intentions within the context of
5 the overall United States strategic competition with
6 the PRC;

7 (6) consider how the PRC uses commercial and
8 scientific cooperation as a guise for establishing ac-
9 cess for the PLA and other PRC security forces in
10 foreign countries;

11 (7) factor in the potential contributions of key
12 allies and partners to help respond to the PRC's
13 pursuit of global basing, many of which—

14 (A) have historic ties and influence in
15 many of the geographic areas the PRC is tar-
16 geting for potential future bases; and

17 (B) rely on the same basic intelligence pic-
18 ture to form our baseline understanding of the
19 PRC's global intentions;

20 (8) establish and ensure sufficient resourcing
21 for enduring organizational structures and security
22 and foreign assistance and cooperation efforts to ef-
23 fectively address the issue of PRC global basing in-
24 tentions; and

1 (9) ensure that future force posture, freedom of
2 movement, and other interests of the United States
3 and our allies are not jeopardized by the continued
4 expansion of PRC bases.

5 **SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.**

6 In this Act:

7 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
8 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
9 mittees” means—

10 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
11 the Senate;

12 (B) the Committee on Armed Services of
13 the Senate;

14 (C) the Select Committee on Intelligence of
15 the Senate;

16 (D) the Committee on Appropriations of
17 the Senate;

18 (E) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
19 the House of Representatives;

20 (F) the Committee on Armed Services of
21 the House of Representatives;

22 (G) the Permanent Select Committee on
23 Intelligence of the House of Representatives;
24 and

1 (H) the Committee on Appropriations of
2 the House of Representatives.

3 (2) PLA.—The term “PLA” means the Peo-
4 ple’s Liberation Army of the PRC.

5 (3) PRC.—The term “PRC” means the Peo-
6 ple’s Republic of China.

7 (4) PRC GLOBAL BASING.—The term “PRC
8 global basing” means the establishment of physical
9 locations outside the geographic boundaries of the
10 PRC where the PRC maintains some element of the
11 People’s Liberation Army, PRC intelligence or secu-
12 rity forces, or infrastructure designed to support the
13 presence of PRC military, intelligence, or security
14 forces, for the purposes of potential power projec-
15 tion.

16 **SEC. 5. ASSESSMENT OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH’S C-PRC**
17 **GLOBAL BASING STRATEGY.**

18 (a) ASSESSMENT.—Not later than 180 days after the
19 date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
20 Intelligence shall submit an intelligence assessment, in
21 classified form, if needed, to the appropriate congressional
22 committees. The assessment shall analyze the risk posed
23 by PRC global basing to the United States or to any
24 United States allies with respect to their ability to project
25 power, maintain freedom of movement, and protect other

1 interests as a function of the PRC's current or potential
2 locations identified pursuant to subsection (b)(2)(A).

3 (b) STRATEGY.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
5 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
6 retary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of
7 Defense and other appropriate senior Federal offi-
8 cials, shall submit a strategy to the appropriate con-
9 gressional committees that contains the information
10 described in paragraph (2).

11 (2) CONTENTS.—The strategy required under
12 paragraph (1) shall—

13 (A) identify not fewer than 5 locations that
14 pose the greatest potential risks, as identified in
15 the assessment required under subsection (a),
16 where the PRC maintains a physical presence,
17 or is suspected to be seeking a physical pres-
18 ence, which could ultimately transition into a
19 PRC global base;

20 (B) include a comprehensive listing of ex-
21 ecutive branch entities currently involved in ad-
22 dressing aspects of PRC global basing, includ-
23 ing estimated programmatic and personal re-
24 source requirements on an agency-by-agency
25 basis to effectively address the issue of PRC

1 global basing intentions, and any relevant re-
2 source constraints;

3 (C) describe in detail all executive branch
4 efforts to mitigate the impacts to the national
5 interests of the United States and partner
6 countries of the locations referred to in sub-
7 paragraph (A) and prevent the PRC from es-
8 tablishing new global bases, including with re-
9 sources described in subparagraph (B); and

10 (D) for each of the locations referred to in
11 subparagraph (A), identify the actions by the
12 United States or its allies that would be most
13 effective in ensuring the respective foreign gov-
14 ernments terminate plans for hosting a PRC
15 base.

16 (c) TASK FORCE.—Not later than 90 days after sub-
17 mitting the strategy described in subsection (b), the Sec-
18 retary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of De-
19 fense and other appropriate senior Federal officials, shall
20 establish an interagency task force—

21 (1) to implement the strategy described in sec-
22 tion (b) to counter the PRC’s efforts at the locations
23 of chief concern; and

24 (2) to identify mitigation measures that would
25 prevent the PRC from establishing new bases in lo-

1 cations beyond the locations of chief concern identi-
2 fied pursuant to subsection (b)(2)(A).

3 (d) QUADRENNIAL REVIEWS AND REPORTS.—Not
4 later than 4 years after the submission of the strategy re-
5 quired under subsection (b), and not less frequently than
6 once every 4 years thereafter, the Secretary of State, in
7 coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Director
8 of National Intelligence, and other appropriate senior Fed-
9 eral officials, shall—

10 (1) conduct a review of the Executive Branch’s
11 strategy and overall approach in response to the
12 PRC global basing intentions; and

13 (2) submit the results of such review, including
14 the information described in subsection (b)(2), to the
15 appropriate congressional committees.

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