

119TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 3225

To reauthorize and modify the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MAY 7, 2025

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey (for himself, Mr. KEATING, and Mr. WILSON of South Carolina) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Financial Services, and the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To reauthorize and modify the Belarus Democracy Act of
2004.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Belarus Democracy,
5 Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 2025”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Section 2 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004
8 (Public Law 108–347; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended
9 to read as follows:

1 **“SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

2 “Congress finds the following:

3 “(1) The International Covenant on Civil and
4 Political Rights, done in New York December 19,
5 1966, was ratified by Belarus in 1973, guaranteeing
6 Belarusians the freedom of expression and the free-
7 dom of association.

8 “(2) Alyaksandr Lukashenka has ruled Belarus
9 as an undemocratic dictatorship since the first presi-
10 dential election in Belarus in 1994, and subsequent
11 presidential elections have been neither free nor fair,
12 failing to meet minimal international electoral stand-
13 ards.

14 “(3) In response to the repression and violence
15 during the 2006 presidential election, Congress
16 passed the Belarus Democracy Reauthorization Act
17 of 2006 (Public Law 109–480).

18 “(4) In 2006, President George W. Bush issued
19 Executive Order 13405, titled ‘Blocking Property of
20 Certain Persons Undermining Democratic Processes
21 or Institutions in Belarus’, which authorized the im-
22 position of sanctions against persons responsible
23 for—

24 “(A) undermining democratic processes in
25 Belarus; or

1 “(B) participating in human rights abuses
2 related to political repression in Belarus.

3 “(5) In March 2011, the Senate unanimously
4 passed Senate Resolution 105, which—

5 “(A) condemned the December 2010 elec-
6 tion in Belarus as ‘illegitimate, fraudulent, and
7 not representative of the will or the aspirations
8 of the voters in Belarus’; and

9 “(B) called on the Lukashenka regime ‘to
10 immediately and unconditionally release all po-
11 litical prisoners in Belarus who were arrested in
12 association with the December 19, 2010, elec-
13 tion’.

14 “(6) The Government of Belarus continues to
15 engage in a pattern of clear and persistent gross vio-
16 lations of internationally recognized human rights,
17 and basic principles of democratic governance.

18 “(7) The Government of Belarus continues to
19 subject thousands of pro-democracy political activists
20 and peaceful protesters to harassment, beatings, and
21 imprisonment, particularly as a result of their at-
22 tempts to peacefully exercise their right to freedom
23 of assembly and association.

24 “(8) The Government of Belarus continues to
25 suppress independent media and journalists and to

1 restrict access to the internet, including social media
2 and other digital communication platforms, in viola-
3 tion of the right to freedom of speech and expression
4 of those dissenting from the dictatorship of
5 Alyaksandr Lukashenka.

6 “(9) The Government of Belarus continues a
7 systematic campaign of harassment, repression, and
8 closure of nongovernmental organizations, including
9 independent trade unions and entrepreneurs, cre-
10 ating a climate of fear that inhibits the development
11 of civil society and social solidarity.

12 “(10) The Government of Belarus has pursued
13 a policy undermining the country’s sovereignty and
14 independence by making Belarus’ political, economic,
15 cultural, and societal interests subservient to those
16 of Russia.

17 “(11) The Government of Belarus continues to
18 reduce the independence of Belarus through integra-
19 tion into a so-called ‘Union State’ that is under the
20 control of Russia.

21 “(12) In advance of the August 2020 presi-
22 dential elections in Belarus, authorities acting on be-
23 half of President Lukashenka arrested journalists,
24 bloggers, political activists, and the leading political

1 opposition candidates, leading to demonstrations in
2 support of democracy.

3 “(13) On August 9, 2020, the Government of
4 Belarus conducted a presidential election that was
5 held under undemocratic conditions, did not meet
6 international standards, involved government malfea-
7 sance and serious irregularities with ballot counting
8 and the reporting of election results, and included
9 restrictive measures that impeded the work of local
10 independent observers and did not provide sufficient
11 notice to the Organization for Security and Coopera-
12 tion in Europe (OSCE) to allow for the OSCE to
13 monitor the elections, as is customary.

14 “(14) Illegitimate president Alyaksandr
15 Lukashenka declared a landslide victory in the elec-
16 tion and claimed to have received more than 80 per-
17 cent of the votes cast in the election.

18 “(15) The leading opposition candidate,
19 Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, formally disputed the re-
20 ported results and was detained by government au-
21 thorities before being forced into exile in Lithuania.

22 “(16) Later in August, 2020, the United States
23 Deputy Secretary of State, Stephen Biegun, and Eu-
24 ropean Union High Representative for Foreign and
25 Security Policy, Josep Borrell, issued statements de-

1 claring the Belarus elections to be fraudulent and
2 neither free nor fair.

3 “(17) Following the illegitimate election results,
4 tens of thousands of Belarusian protestors took to
5 the streets, led predominately by women, resulting in
6 the largest protest rallies in Belarus’ modern his-
7 tory, with over 1,400 reported as injured by
8 Belarusian police in August and September 2020,
9 over 37,000 detained by May 2021, and several
10 killed for protesting the fraudulent election.

11 “(18) The Government of Belarus has consist-
12 ently restricted the free flow of information to si-
13 lence the opposition and to conceal the regime’s vio-
14 lent crackdown on peaceful protestors, including
15 through the suppression of independent media and
16 journalists, and disruption of free internet access.

17 “(19) After the employees of state media out-
18 lets walked off the job in protest rather than help
19 report misleading government propaganda,
20 Lukashenka confirmed that he ‘asked the Russians’
21 to send teams of Russian journalists to replace local
22 employees.

23 “(20) Following Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s Sep-
24 tember 23, 2020, inauguration, the United States,
25 the European Union, numerous European states, the

1 United Kingdom, and Canada announced that they
2 cannot consider Mr. Lukashenka as the legitimately
3 elected leader of Belarus.

4 “(21) As a result of the Lukashenka regime’s
5 violence against the Belarusian people and depriva-
6 tion of their fundamental rights, the United States
7 Congress passed and the President signed into law
8 the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and Sov-
9 ereignty Act of 2020 to demand the rights of the
10 Belarusian people be respected and to hold account-
11 able those who undermine them.

12 “(22) As a result of the Lukashenka regime’s
13 violence against its own people, in December 2020,
14 Members of Congress and transatlantic parliamen-
15 tarians wrote a letter to the International Ice Hock-
16 ey Federation President demanding the champion-
17 ship be relocated from Belarus.

18 “(23) In response to the Government of
19 Belarus’ repressive actions following the 2020 elec-
20 tion, the United States, along with the European
21 Union, imposed various sanctions packages on indi-
22 viduals and entities involved with the suppression of
23 democracy in Belarus, including—

24 “(A) the Central Election Commission of
25 the Republic of Belarus and officials deter-

1 mined to be responsible for undermining democ-
2 racy in Belarus;

3 “(B) entities and persons determined to be
4 involved in the violent suppression of protestors,
5 such as the Minsk Special Purpose Police Unit,
6 the Main Internal Affairs Directorate of the
7 Minsk City Executive Committee, and KGB
8 Alpha; and

9 “(C) state-owned enterprises that provide
10 revenue to support Lukashenka’s authoritarian
11 regime.

12 “(24) In April 2021, the House of Representa-
13 tives passed House Resolution 124 reaffirming that
14 the August 2020 elections were neither free nor fair
15 and that the House of Representatives does not rec-
16 ognize Alyaksandr Lukashenka as Belarus’ legiti-
17 mate president.

18 “(25) On May 23, 2021, the Government of
19 Belarus forced Ryanair Flight 4978 to land in
20 Belarus as it neared the border of Lithuania after
21 calling in a false bomb report and subsequently ar-
22 rested independent Belarusian opposition blogger
23 and political activist Raman Pratasevich and his
24 girlfriend, threatening the safety of every passenger

1 aboard the civilian flight, and ultimately detaining
2 Pratasevich as a political prisoner.

3 “(26) In May 2021, the European Union
4 pledged a comprehensive plan of economic support
5 worth up to 3 billion euros to assist in the develop-
6 ment of a future, democratic Belarus following a
7 democratic transition.

8 “(27) As of May 2025, the Government of
9 Belarus, led illegally by Alyaksandr Lukashenka, un-
10 lawfully holds nearly 1,300 people as political pris-
11 oners, including dozens of journalists, peaceful
12 protestors, business leaders, and democracy activists,
13 including Siarhei Tsikhanouski, a former opposition
14 leader who is held incommunicado, Ilhar Losik and
15 Ihar Karney, journalists with Radio Free Europe/
16 Radio Liberty, Andrzej Poczubut, a Polish-
17 Belarusian journalist, and Artsiom Liabedzka, the
18 son of exiled former opposition leader Anatol
19 Liabedzka.

20 “(28) Since August 2020, the the Government
21 of Belarus, led illegally by Alyaksandr Lukashenka,
22 has targeted religious communities who raised their
23 voices against the undemocratic rule and violent re-
24 pression committed by the authorities, and has un-
25 lawfully detained nearly 90 members of the clergy,

1 including 39 Catholic priests and religious, 30
2 Protestant ministers, and 20 Orthodox priests and
3 religious, including 5 priests who are currently re-
4 main behind bars and are recognized as political
5 prisoners.

6 “(29) The now-suspended Belarusian branch of
7 the Red Cross has publicly confirmed its involvement
8 in transferring children from Ukraine to the terri-
9 tory of Belarus, and the illegitimate leader of the
10 Government of Belarus, Alyaksandr Lukashenka,
11 has publicly confirmed that he permitted these
12 transfers.

13 “(30) In Spring 2023, the Government of
14 Belarus announced plans for the deployment of nu-
15 clear weapons from the Russian Federation to the
16 territory of Belarus, which reportedly began in the
17 summer of this same year.

18 “(31) The Government of Belarus has harbored
19 the Wagner Group, a private military company the
20 United States has designated as a Transnational
21 Criminal Organization, and provided facilities, re-
22 sources, and a staging ground for the group’s crimi-
23 nal operations.

24 “(32) The Government of Belarus has report-
25 edly provided the Government of the Russian Fed-

1 eration with tens of thousands of tons of ammuni-
2 tion throughout Russia’s unprovoked war of aggres-
3 sion in Ukraine.

4 “(33) As a result of the Government of
5 Belarus’ support to the Russian Federation during
6 its unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine,
7 the United States, the European Union, and the
8 United Kingdom have repeatedly issued further
9 sanctions packages against the Lukashenka regime
10 to target Belarusian military officers as well as indi-
11 viduals in the military sector, restrictions on entities
12 in Belarus’ defense and industrial sectors, and enti-
13 ties that provide support to Belarus’ military and in-
14 dustrial sectors.

15 “(34) The Government of Belarus is reportedly
16 engaging in the purchase of significant amounts of
17 military equipment from the sanctioned Islamic Re-
18 public of Iran.

19 “(35) On August 6, 2023, the Belarusian
20 democratic opposition issued a declaration express-
21 ing their objective of developing democracy in
22 Belarus and pursuing membership in the European
23 Union and, by extension, joining the Trans-Atlantic
24 community.

1 “(36) The democratic opposition of Belarus
2 have called on the Government of Belarus, led ille-
3 gally by Alyaksandr Lukashenka, to end its com-
4 plicity and involvement in the war in Ukraine, and
5 urged against the conscription of men into the
6 Belarusian military.

7 “(37) On February 28, 2022, the Department
8 of State ordered the departure of United States Gov-
9 ernment employees and the suspension of operations
10 of the United States Embassy in Minsk.

11 “(38) On August 21, 2023, the United States
12 Government directed all United States citizens to
13 leave Belarus immediately due to the illegitimate
14 Belarusian authorities’ continued cooperation with
15 the Russian military and facilitation of Russia’s
16 unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, and
17 the risk of detention and arbitrary enforcement of
18 local laws against United States citizens.

19 “(39) In September 2023, the Government of
20 Belarus deprived Belarusians living abroad of their
21 ability to renew their passports through Belarusian
22 embassies in an attempt to make life difficult for
23 and to force exiles, critics, and expats to return to
24 Belarus for document renewal and possibly face per-
25 secution.

1 “(40) In December 2023, the United States
2 Government held a Strategic Dialogue with the
3 Belarusian democratic opposition and civil society
4 and subsequently announced a continuation of ef-
5 forts to hold Alyaksandr Lukashenka and his regime
6 accountable for their crimes, a commitment to sup-
7 porting Belarusian culture, sovereignty, and national
8 identity, as well as the need for future working
9 groups with the democratic opposition.

10 “(41) On February 25, 2024, the Government
11 of Belarus administered fraudulent parliamentary
12 elections in an environment marked by censorship,
13 persecution of political opposition, illegal manipula-
14 tion of the vote, and the lack of any international
15 observers from credible organizations.

16 “(42) In December 2024 Lukashenka an-
17 nounced that Belarus is hosting dozens of Russian
18 nuclear weapons and will prepare facilities for
19 hosting Russian hypersonic missiles.

20 “(43) On January 26, 2025, the Government of
21 Belarus administered fraudulent presidential elec-
22 tions in an environment marked by censorship, per-
23 secution of political opposition, illegal manipulation
24 of the vote, the lack of any international observers

1 from credible organizations, and declared victory for
2 Lukashenka.

3 “(44) The Russian Federation has facilitated
4 and the Belarusian government is complicit in the il-
5 legal abduction and transfer of more than 2,400
6 Ukrainian children from Russian-occupied regions of
7 Ukraine to facilities in Belarus where they undergo
8 political and cultural reeducation and military train-
9 ing.

10 “(45) The United States has imposed sanctions
11 on hundreds of Belarusian individuals and entities,
12 including visa restrictions against Belarusian govern-
13 ment officials for undermining democracy in Belarus
14 and supporting Russia’s illegal war of aggression in
15 Ukraine, and their complicity in the abduction of
16 Ukrainian children from Russian-occupied territories
17 of Ukraine.’”

18 **SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

19 Section 3 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004
20 (Public Law 108–347; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended
21 to read as follows:

22 **“SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

23 “It is the policy of the United States—

24 “(1) to condemn—

1 “(A) the conduct of the August 9, 2020,
2 presidential election in Belarus, which was nei-
3 ther free nor fair;

4 “(B) the Belarusian authorities’ unrelent-
5 ing crackdown on, arbitrary arrests of, and vio-
6 lence against opposition candidates, democratic
7 opposition, peaceful protestors, human rights
8 activists, employees from state-owned enter-
9 prises participating in strikes, independent elec-
10 tion observers, and independent journalists and
11 bloggers; and

12 “(C) the unjustified detention and forced
13 or attempted deportation of members of the Co-
14 ordination Council and United Transitional
15 Cabinet in Belarus;

16 “(2) to condemn the illegitimate Belarusian au-
17 thorities’ allowance of Russian nuclear weapons to
18 be deployed to Belarusian territory, their continued
19 political and material support for Russia’s
20 unprovoked war of aggression in Ukraine, and their
21 continued participation in abducting and deporting
22 Ukrainian children from territory occupied by the
23 Russian Federation to the territory of Belarus;

24 “(3) to condemn the presence of Russian forces
25 in Belarusian territory and demand the cessation of

1 the use of Belarusian territory by Russian forces as
2 a staging ground for Russia’s illegal, full-scale war
3 of aggression against Ukraine or for the prevention
4 of a peaceful democratic transition in Belarus;

5 “(4) to demand accountability for the illegal
6 Lukashenka regime’s complicity in the crime of ag-
7 gression against Ukraine through international jus-
8 tice mechanisms;

9 “(5) to condemn the weaponization of migrants
10 wherein the Government of Belarus, led illegally by
11 Alyaksandr Lukashenka, has sent thousands of mi-
12 grants to the borders of Poland and Lithuania in an
13 attempt to destabilize the border region;

14 “(6) to continue demanding the immediate re-
15 lease without preconditions of all political prisoners
16 in Belarus and those arrested for peacefully pro-
17 testing, including all those individuals detained in
18 connection with the August 9, 2020, fraudulent
19 presidential election;

20 “(7) to stand in solidarity with the people of
21 Belarus, including human rights defenders, bloggers,
22 and journalists, who are exercising their right to
23 freedom of assembly, freedom of expression, and rule
24 of law and to continue supporting the aspirations of

1 the people of Belarus for democracy, human rights,
2 and the rule of law;

3 “(8) to continue actively supporting the aspira-
4 tions of the people of the Republic of Belarus to pre-
5 serve the independence and sovereignty of their
6 country;

7 “(9) to continue refusing to recognize
8 Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s illegitimate regime and to
9 continue supporting calls for Belarusian presidential
10 and parliamentary elections to be conducted in a
11 manner that is free and fair according to Organiza-
12 tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe
13 (OSCE) standards and under the supervision of
14 OSCE observers and independent domestic observ-
15 ers, including in the 2025 presidential elections;

16 “(10) to continue calling for the Government of
17 Belarus to fulfill its freely undertaken obligations as
18 an OSCE participating state and as a signatory of
19 the Charter of the United Nations;

20 “(11) to recognize the Coordination Council
21 and the United Transitional Cabinet as legitimate
22 institutions to participate in a dialogue on a peaceful
23 transition of power, and to support these institutions
24 prior to and during such a transition should it take
25 place;

1 “(12) to condemn the deprivation of consular
2 services to Belarusian citizens living abroad, includ-
3 ing representatives of the Belarusian democratic op-
4 position, and urge the United States to raise this to
5 the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
6 gees, the International Organization for Migration,
7 the Council of Europe, and the Organization for Se-
8 curity and Cooperation in Europe;

9 “(13) to encourage the United States Govern-
10 ment to continue working closely with the European
11 Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, and other
12 countries and international organizations to continue
13 to impose targeted sanctions against officials in
14 Belarus who are responsible for—

15 “(A) undermining democratic processes in
16 Belarus;

17 “(B) participating in gross violations of
18 internationally recognized human rights related
19 to political repression in Belarus and under-
20 mining rule of law for the people of Belarus; or

21 “(C) enabling or facilitating Russia’s war
22 in Ukraine;

23 “(14) to call on the Government of Belarus to
24 uphold its human rights obligations, including those

1 rights enumerated in the International Covenant on
2 Civil and Political Rights;

3 “(15) to encourage the United States to expedi-
4 tiously appoint a U.S. Special Envoy for Belarus to
5 fill the role vacated in June 2022; and

6 “(16) to support the use of the Strategic Dia-
7 logue between the United States Government as a
8 means of furthering ties between the United States
9 Government and the representatives of the demo-
10 cratic opposition of Belarus in pursuit of objectives,
11 including—

12 “(A) accountability for the Lukashenka re-
13 gime’s gross violations of internationally recog-
14 nized human rights and domestic repressions;
15 and

16 “(B) increasing partnerships with the
17 Belarusian people by supporting investments;
18 and

19 support for the protection of Belarusian language,
20 culture, and national identity.”.

21 **SEC. 4. ASSISTANCE TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY, CIVIL SO-**
22 **CIETY, AND SOVEREIGNTY IN BELARUS.**

23 Section 4 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004
24 (Public Law 108–347; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amend-
25 ed—

1 (1) in subsection (a)—

2 (A) in paragraph (1), by inserting “, the
3 United Transitional Cabinet, and the Coordina-
4 tion Council” after “the Republic of Belarus”;
5 and

6 (B) by adding at the end the following:

7 “(5) To assist in the cessation of Belarus’ sup-
8 port for the Government of Russia in Russia’s
9 unprovoked war of aggression in Ukraine.”;

10 (2) in subsection (b), by adding at the end be-
11 fore the period the following “, including political
12 party strengthening”;

13 (3) by amending subsection (c) to read as fol-
14 lows:

15 “(c) ACTIVITIES SUPPORTED.—Activities that may
16 be supported by assistance under subsection (b) include—

17 “(1) expanding independent radio and television
18 broadcasting to and within Belarus;

19 “(2) facilitating the development of independent
20 broadcast, print, and internet media working within
21 Belarus and from locations outside the country and
22 supported by nonstate-controlled printing facilities;

23 “(3) countering internet censorship and repres-
24 sive surveillance technology that seek to limit free
25 association, control access to information, and pre-

1 vent citizens from exercising their rights to free
2 speech;

3 “(4) raising awareness both within Belarus and
4 globally about Lukashenka’s complicity in Russia’s
5 unprovoked war of aggression in Ukraine, including
6 how the Lukashenka regime is providing support to
7 the Russian military and committing crimes against
8 Ukrainian children;

9 “(5) aiding the development of civil society
10 through assistance to nongovernmental organizations
11 promoting democracy and supporting human rights,
12 including youth groups, entrepreneurs, and inde-
13 pendent trade unions;

14 “(6) supporting programming that contributes
15 to the defense of Belarusian sovereignty and inde-
16 pendance from encroachment by the Russian Fed-
17 eration;

18 “(7) supporting the work of human rights de-
19 fenders;

20 “(8) enhancing the development of democratic
21 political parties;

22 “(9) assisting the promotion of free, fair, and
23 transparent electoral processes;

24 “(10) enhancing international exchanges and
25 advanced professional training programs for leaders

1 and members of the democratic opposition in skill
2 areas central to the development of civil society;

3 “(11) supporting the work of women advocating
4 for freedom, human rights, and human progress in
5 Belarus given the significant and vital role women
6 have played in the Belarus democracy movement;

7 “(12) supporting the development of Belarusian
8 language and cultural education and exchanges to
9 preserve and protect Belarusian national identity;

10 “(13) supporting further iterations of the Stra-
11 tegic Dialogue between the United States and the
12 Belarusian democratic opposition and civil society as
13 a platform to work on issues of mutual concern;

14 “(14) enhancing the development of the private
15 sector, particularly the information technology sec-
16 tor, and its role in the economy of Belarus, including
17 by increasing the capacity of private sector actors,
18 developing business support organizations, offering
19 entrepreneurship training, and expanding access to
20 finance for small and medium enterprises;

21 “(15) supporting political refugees in neigh-
22 boring European countries fleeing the crackdown in
23 Belarus;

24 “(16) supporting the education of Belarusians
25 in exile;

1 “(17) supporting the gathering of evidence on
2 and investigating of gross violations of internation-
3 ally recognized human rights in Belarus; and

4 “(18) other activities consistent with the pur-
5 poses of this Act.”;

6 (4) in subsection (f)—

7 (A) by striking “the Belarus Democracy,
8 Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 2020”
9 and inserting “the Belarus Democracy, Human
10 Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 2025”; and

11 (B) by adding at the end before the period
12 the following: “as well as the methodology and
13 benchmarks used to assess the effectiveness of
14 such funds”; and

15 (5) by amending subsection (g) to read as fol-
16 lows:

17 “(g) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There
18 are authorized to be appropriated to the President to carry
19 out this section—

20 “(1) for fiscal year 2026 an amount equal to
21 not less than the amount made available to carry out
22 this section for fiscal year 2025; and

23 “(2) for fiscal year 2027 an amount equal to
24 not less than the amount made available to carry out
25 this section for fiscal year 2026.”.

1 **SEC. 5. INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING, INTERNET FREE-**
2 **DOM, AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION IN**
3 **BELARUS.**

4 Section 5 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004
5 (Public Law 109–480; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amend-
6 ed—

7 (1) in subsection (a)—

8 (A) BY STRIKING “(A) SENSE OF CON-
9 GRESS.—;

10 (B) in paragraph (4), by striking “and” at
11 the end;

12 (C) in paragraph (5), by striking the pe-
13 riod at the end and inserting the following:
14 “and advocate for the release of journalists that
15 are detained by political reasons; and”; and

16 (D) by adding at the end the following:

17 “(6) the United States should also support
18 independent media outlets and other sources of in-
19 formation in providing accurate and truthful infor-
20 mation about Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression
21 in Ukraine, and the illegitimate Lukashenka re-
22 gime’s complicity in Russia’s crimes of aggression.”;
23 and

24 (2) by striking subsection (b).

1 **SEC. 6. SANCTIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF**
2 **BELARUS.**

3 Section 6 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004
4 (Public Law 109–480; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amend-
5 ed—

6 (1) in subsection (a)—

7 (A) by striking “The sanctions” and in-
8 serting the following:

9 “(1) IN GENERAL.—The sanctions”; and

10 (B) by adding at the end the following:

11 “(2) MAINTENANCE OF EXISTING SANC-
12 TIONS.—

13 “(A) IN GENERAL.—Any sanctions im-
14 posed pursuant to the Executive orders de-
15 scribed in subparagraph (B) that were imposed
16 in connection with conduct relating to, con-
17 cerning, or occurring in Belarus should remain
18 in effect until the President determines and cer-
19 tifies to the appropriate congressional commit-
20 tees that the Government of Belarus has made
21 significant progress in meeting the conditions
22 described in subsection (c).

23 “(B) EXECUTIVE ORDERS DESCRIBED.—

24 The Executive orders described in this subpara-
25 graph are the following:

1 “(i) Executive Order 13405 (71 Fed.
2 Reg. 35485; relating to blocking property
3 of certain persons undermining democratic
4 processes or institutions in Belarus).

5 “(ii) Executive Order 14024 (86 Fed.
6 Reg. 20249; relating to blocking property
7 with respect to specified harmful foreign
8 activities of the Government of the Russian
9 Federation).

10 “(iii) Executive Order 14038 (86 Fed.
11 Reg. 43905; relating to blocking property
12 of additional persons contributing to the
13 situation in Belarus).”;

14 (2) in subsection (b)—

15 (A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1),
16 by striking “subsection (a)” and inserting
17 “paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a)”;

18 (B) by striking paragraph (2);

19 (C) by redesignating paragraphs (3), (4),
20 and (5) as paragraphs (2), (3), and (4), respec-
21 tively; and

22 (D) by adding at the end the following:

23 “(5) The withdrawal of the armed forces of the
24 Russian Federation from the Republic of Belarus

1 and the cessation of Belarusian support for the Rus-
2 sian Federation’s war against Ukraine.

3 “(6) The return of all Ukrainian children ab-
4 ducted and deported to Belarus from the territory of
5 Ukraine illegally occupied by the Russian Federa-
6 tion.”;

7 (3) in subsection (c)—

8 (A) in the subsection heading, by striking
9 “complicit in the crackdown that occurred after
10 the august 9, 2020, election”;

11 (B) in the matter preceding paragraph (1),
12 by striking “may” and inserting “shall”;

13 (C) in paragraph (2), by striking “inad-
14 missible under” and inserting “described in”;

15 (D) in paragraph (4), by adding at the end
16 before the semicolon the following: “, or future
17 elections in Belarus should they be determined
18 to be neither free nor fair”;

19 (E) in paragraph (5), by adding at the end
20 before the semicolon the following: “, or future
21 elections in Belarus should they be determined
22 to be neither free nor fair”;

23 (F) by striking paragraphs (6), (7), (8),
24 and (9) and inserting the following:

1 “(6) is a government official or member of the
2 security or law enforcement services of Belarus and
3 has participated in the persecution or harassment of
4 religious groups, human rights defenders, democratic
5 opposition groups, or independent media or journal-
6 ists;

7 “(7) is an individual determined by the Presi-
8 dent to be interfering in the internal affairs of the
9 Republic of Belarus on behalf of or at the direction
10 of the Government of the Russian Federation;

11 “(8) is an official who provides for, facilitates,
12 or otherwise enables or engages with the abduction
13 and deportation of Ukrainian children from terri-
14 tories illegally occupied by the Russian Federation to
15 the territory of Belarus;

16 “(9) is an official who provides for, facilitates,
17 or otherwise enables the Russian Federation to use
18 the territory of Belarus to further its unprovoked in-
19 vasion of Ukraine;

20 “(10) is an official of the so-called ‘Union
21 State’ between Russia and Belarus (regardless of
22 nationality of the individual) or works toward the
23 furtherance of such Union State; or

24 “(11) is a Russian individual that has signifi-
25 cantly participated in the crackdown on independent

1 press or human rights abuses related to political re-
2 pression in Belarus, including the Russian propa-
3 gandists sent to replace local employees at
4 Belarusian state media outlets.”;

5 (4) by amending subsection (f) to read as fol-
6 lows:

7 “(f) BLOCKING OF ASSETS AND OTHER PROHIBITED
8 ACTIVITIES.—

9 “(1) MANDATORY SANCTION.—The President
10 shall impose the sanction described in paragraph (3)
11 with respect to each foreign person that the Presi-
12 dent determines—

13 “(A) is a member of the Central Election
14 Commission of Belarus or assisted the Commis-
15 sion in manipulating elections in Belarus in-
16 cluding the presidential election of August 9,
17 2020;

18 “(B) is a government official or member of
19 the security or law enforcement services of
20 Belarus and has participated in the persecution
21 or harassment of religious groups, human
22 rights defenders, democratic opposition groups,
23 or independent media or journalists;

24 “(C) is an individual determined by the
25 President to be knowingly interfering in the in-

1 ternal affairs of the Republic of Belarus on be-
2 half of or at the direction of the Government of
3 the Russian Federation;

4 “(D) is an official who knowingly engages
5 in the abduction and deportation of Ukrainian
6 children from territories illegally occupied by
7 the Russian Federation to the territory of
8 Belarus;

9 “(E) is an official who knowingly supports
10 and provides for, the Russian Federation’s use
11 of the territory or Belarus to further its
12 unprovoked invasion of Ukraine; or

13 “(F) is an official in the so-called ‘Union
14 State’ between Russia and Belarus (regardless
15 of nationality of the individual) or works toward
16 the furtherance of such ‘Union State’.

17 “(2) DISCRETIONARY SANCTION.—The Presi-
18 dent may impose the sanction described in para-
19 graph (3) with respect to each foreign person that
20 the President determines—

21 “(A) holds a position in the senior leader-
22 ship of the Government of Belarus;

23 “(B) is an immediate family member of a
24 person described in subparagraph (A); or

1 “(C) through his or her business dealings
2 with a person described in subparagraph (A)
3 derives significant financial benefit from policies
4 or actions, including electoral fraud, gross viola-
5 tions of internationally recognized human
6 rights, or corruption, that undermine or injure
7 democratic institutions or impede the transition
8 to democracy in Belarus.

9 “(3) SANCTION DESCRIBED.—The President
10 shall exercise all of the powers granted to the Presi-
11 dent under the International Emergency Economic
12 Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent
13 necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in
14 property and interests in property of the foreign per-
15 son if such property and interests in property are in
16 the United States, come within the United States, or
17 are or come within the possession or control of a
18 United States person.

19 “(4) EXCEPTIONS.—

20 “(A) EXCEPTION RELATING TO THE PRO-
21 VISION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.—The
22 sanction described in paragraph (3) may not be
23 imposed with respect to transactions or the fa-
24 cilitation of transactions for—

1 “(i) the sale of agricultural commod-
2 ities, food, medicine, or medical devices;

3 “(ii) the provision of humanitarian as-
4 sistance;

5 “(iii) financial transactions relating to
6 humanitarian assistance; or

7 “(iv) transporting goods or services
8 that are necessary to carry out operations
9 relating to humanitarian assistance.

10 “(B) EXCEPTION FOR INTELLIGENCE, LAW
11 ENFORCEMENT, AND NATIONAL SECURITY AC-
12 TIVITIES.—The sanction described in paragraph
13 (3) shall not apply to any authorized intel-
14 ligence, law enforcement, or national security
15 activities of the United States.

16 “(5) WAIVER.—The President may, on a case-
17 by-case basis and for periods not to exceed 180 days
18 each, waive the application of the sanction described
19 in paragraph (3) imposed with respect to a foreign
20 person under this subsection if the President cer-
21 tifies to the appropriate congressional committees
22 not later than 15 days before such waiver is to take
23 effect that the waiver is important to the national
24 security interests of the United States.

1 “(6) PENALTIES.—Any person who violates, at-
2 tempts to violate, or causes a violation of this sub-
3 section or any regulation, license, or order issued to
4 carry out this subsection shall be subject to the pen-
5 alties under section 206 of the International Emer-
6 gency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the
7 same extent as a person that commits an unlawful
8 act under that Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).

9 “(7) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection—

10 “(A) the term ‘air carrier’ has the meaning
11 given that term in section 40102 of title 49,
12 United States Code;

13 “(B) the term ‘foreign person’ means a
14 person that is not a United States person; and

15 “(C) the term ‘United States person’
16 means—

17 “(i) any United States citizen or alien
18 admitted for permanent residence to the
19 United States;

20 “(ii) any entity organized under the
21 laws of the United States; and

22 “(iii) any person in the United
23 States.”.

1 **SEC. 7. MULTILATERAL COOPERATION.**

2 Section 7 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004
3 (Public Law 109–480; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amend-
4 ed—

5 (1) in paragraph (1), by striking “and” at the
6 end;

7 (2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at
8 the end and inserting “; and”; and

9 (3) by adding at the end the following:

10 “(3) to halt the Government of Belarus, led ille-
11 gally by Alyaksandr Lukashenka, from supporting
12 and assisting the Russian Federation’s unprovoked
13 war of aggression against Ukraine including the ab-
14 duction and deportation of Ukrainian children.”.

15 **SEC. 8. REPORTS.**

16 Section 8 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004
17 (Public Law 109–480; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amend-
18 ed—

19 (1) by striking subsection (a);

20 (2) by redesignating subsection (b) as sub-
21 section (a);

22 (3) in subsection (a) (as so redesignated)—

23 (A) in paragraph (1)—

24 (i) in the matter preceding subpara-
25 graph (A), by striking “the Belarus De-
26 mocracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty

1 Act of 2020” and inserting “the Belarus
2 Democracy, Human Rights, and Sov-
3 ereignty Act of 2025”; and

4 (ii) in subparagraph (B), by adding at
5 the end before the period the following: “,
6 and whether the United States has im-
7 posed sanctions with respect to such senior
8 foreign political figures”;

9 (B) by striking paragraph (2); and

10 (C) by redesignating paragraph (3) as
11 paragraph (2); and

12 (4) by adding at the end the following:

13 “(b) REPORT ON CRIMES AND OTHER ACTIONS COM-
14 MITTED BY BELARUS IN SUPPORT OF RUSSIA’S
15 UNPROVOKED WAR OF AGGRESSION IN UKRAINE.—

16 “(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days
17 after the date of the enactment of the Belarus De-
18 mocracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of
19 2025, the Director of National Intelligence, in con-
20 sultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the
21 Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate
22 congressional committees a report on the following:

23 “(A) An assessment of the Russian mili-
24 tary presence in Belarus, including the presence
25 of Russian nuclear forces, and the impact this

1 presence has on North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
2 zation (NATO) security.

3 “(B) The degree to which the Government
4 of Belarus, led illegally by Alyaksandr
5 Lukashenka, continues to provide support to
6 and harbor the forces of the Wagner Group or
7 other Russian paramilitary groups and enables
8 their destabilizing actions on the borders of
9 NATO allies, such as Latvia, Lithuania, and
10 Poland.

11 “(C) Which actors in the Government of
12 Belarus, led illegally by Alyaksandr
13 Lukashenka, are most responsible for the illegal
14 abduction and deportation of Ukrainian chil-
15 dren from Ukrainian territory occupied by the
16 Russian Federation to the territory of Belarus,
17 as well as to what extent organizations such as
18 the now-suspended Belarus branch of the Red
19 Cross are involved in these transfers, and pro-
20 vide a strategy for holding those involved in
21 these crimes accountable including through the
22 use of sanctions.

23 “(D) The degree to which the Government
24 of Belarus, led illegally by Alyaksandr
25 Lukashenka, has purchased weapons from the

1 governments of the Russian Federation and the
2 Islamic Republic of Iran, and whether any pur-
3 chases of such weapons violate the provisions of
4 section 107 or 231 of the Countering America's
5 Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C.
6 9406 or 9525).

7 “(E) The extent to which the Government
8 of Belarus, led illegally by Alyaksandr
9 Lukashenka, is aiding the Russian Federation
10 in circumventing export controls and evading
11 sanctions, including with an accounting and es-
12 timated value of dual-use goods and an identi-
13 fication of the officials or other persons involved
14 in facilitating this sanctions evasion.

15 “(F) The impact of the Government of
16 Belarus’ use of illegal migrants to destabilize
17 the borders of NATO countries, such as Latvia,
18 Lithuania, and Poland, on NATO security.

19 “(2) FORM.—The report required under this
20 subsection shall be transmitted in unclassified form,
21 but may contain a classified annex.”.

22 **SEC. 9. DEFINITIONS.**

23 Section 9 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004
24 (Public Law 109–480; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amend-
25 ed—

1 (1) in paragraph (3)(A), by adding at the end
2 before the semicolon the following: “, led illegally by
3 Alyaksandr Lukashenka”; and

4 (2) by adding at the end the following:

5 “(4) UNION STATE.—The term ‘Union State’
6 means the supranational union of the Republic of
7 Belarus and the Russian Federation as outlined in
8 the December 1999 Treaty on the establishment of
9 the Union State between the governments of the Re-
10 public of Belarus and the Russian Federation.”.

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