

119TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 2504

To require the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to strengthen United States-European nuclear energy cooperation and combat Russian malign influence in the nuclear energy sector in Europe.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 31, 2025

Mr. KEATING (for himself, Mr. FOSTER, and Mr. HUIZENGA) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

A BILL

To require the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to strengthen United States-European nuclear energy cooperation and combat Russian malign influence in the nuclear energy sector in Europe.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “The U.S.-European
5 Nuclear Energy Cooperation Act of 2025”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress finds the following:

1 (1) On February 24, 2022, the Russian Federa-
2 tion initiated a full-scale invasion of Ukraine which
3 has severely threatened energy security in the
4 United States, Europe, and around the world.

5 (2) The security of Ukraine’s energy grid has
6 been vital to Ukraine’s success in its defense of its
7 territory and ensuring the Ukrainian government
8 can effectively provide goods and services to Ukrain-
9 ian citizens.

10 (3) Ukraine has operated four nuclear power
11 plants with 15 reactors, primarily Russian-designed
12 water-water energetic reactor (VVER) reactors.

13 (4) Russia, in its war of aggression against
14 Ukraine, has systematically targeted Ukraine’s en-
15 ergy infrastructure through heavy shelling and tar-
16 geted attacks, particularly in the winter months
17 when innocent Ukrainian civilians are most vulner-
18 able.

19 (5) Since March 2022, Russian forces have ille-
20 gally occupied the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Sta-
21 tion, the largest nuclear power plant in Europe, and
22 Russian forces have surrounded the station with
23 landmines, further threatening regional security.

24 (6) Russian-designed VVER reactors have been
25 built across Europe, including in Belarus, Bulgaria,

1 the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Hungary,
2 Slovakia, Turkey, and Ukraine.

3 (7) Russia uses its nuclear power plant designs
4 and fuel services to spread malign influence and
5 threaten United States and European energy secu-
6 rity.

7 (8) As of 2021, Russia owned about 20 percent
8 of the total uranium conversion infrastructure world-
9 wide and in 2020, had the largest uranium enrich-
10 ment capacity at close to 46 percent.

11 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

12 It is the sense of Congress that—

13 (1) in countries seeking or developing a nuclear
14 power industry, the Department of State should
15 prioritize the utilization of products and services
16 from the United States, and then prioritize products
17 and services from Europe and other allied or partner
18 countries, including Canada, Japan, the United
19 Kingdom, and the Republic of Korea when not di-
20 rectly competing with the United States;

21 (2) the United States and its allies must focus
22 on cooperation, including capacity building and
23 early-stage project support, to expand the nuclear
24 industry in Europe in a way that maintains non-
25 proliferation, security, and safety standards and

1 aligns with international obligations and treaties
2 while combating Russian and Chinese malign influ-
3 ence; and

4 (3) the United States should continue to pursue
5 the Foundational Infrastructure for Responsible Use
6 of Small Modular Reactor Technology program as a
7 means of helping partner countries meet their clean
8 energy needs with scalable, flexible, secure, and safe
9 nuclear power programs.

10 **SEC. 4. STRATEGY.**

11 (a) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—The Secretary of State,
12 in consultation with the Secretary of Energy and the
13 heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies,
14 shall develop a strategy to strengthen United States-Euro-
15 pean nuclear energy cooperation and combat Russian ma-
16 lign influence in the nuclear energy sector in Europe.

17 (b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required by subsection
18 (a) shall include, at a minimum, the following elements:

19 (1) An overview and assessment of the Sec-
20 retary of State's efforts to broaden participation by
21 United States nuclear industry entities in Europe
22 and promote the accessibility and competitiveness of
23 United States, European, and partner technologies
24 and services against Russian and Chinese tech-
25 nologies in Europe.

1 (2) An overview of different nuclear reactor
2 types that are currently deployed or under regu-
3 latory review in Europe, including large light-water
4 reactors, small modular light-water reactors, and
5 non-light-water reactors, and—

6 (A) what role, if any, each reactor type
7 could have in reducing Russia’s influence over
8 European energy supply by 2030, 2035, 2040,
9 2045, and 2050;

10 (B) challenges that each reactor type may
11 face with rapid deployment, including costs,
12 market barriers to first-of-a-kind designs, sup-
13 ply chain constraints, and regulatory require-
14 ments;

15 (C) the impacts of each reactor type on
16 maintaining strong nonproliferation standards,
17 including the minimization of weapons-usable
18 nuclear material; and

19 (D) opportunities for the use of United
20 States, European, and partner technologies and
21 services in the deployment or potential deploy-
22 ment of each reactor type.

23 (3) An overview of different fuel cycles that are
24 currently deployed or under consideration in Europe,
25 including use of low enriched uranium, including

1 high assay low enriched uranium, and spent fuel re-
2 processing, along with an analysis of the implica-
3 tions of each fuel cycle on—

4 (A) reducing and eliminating Russia's
5 market share in Europe for uranium, conver-
6 sion, enrichment, and reactor fuel between now
7 and 2030;

8 (B) achieving long-term energy security
9 free of Russian influence; and

10 (C) maintaining strong nonproliferation
11 standards, including the minimization of weap-
12 ons-usable material as well as high nuclear safe-
13 ty and security standards.

14 (4) An overview of nuclear reactor designs and
15 fuel cycle infrastructure that the United States Gov-
16 ernment is currently funding the development of,
17 and—

18 (A) the potential, if any, that each of these
19 technologies have to decrease or eliminate Rus-
20 sia's market share in the United States and
21 Europe for nuclear power reactors, uranium
22 mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel
23 fabrication, deconversion, and spent nuclear
24 fuel reprocessing in the short, medium, and
25 long term;

1 (B) the impact of these technologies on the
2 minimization of weapons-usable nuclear mate-
3 rial, including the use of highly enriched ura-
4 nium or plutonium fuels; and

5 (C) an assessment of the use cases for
6 each of these designs and fuel cycles.

7 (5) An overview of the United States Govern-
8 ment's diplomatic engagements regarding the nu-
9 clear energy sector in Europe.

10 (6) A list of countries in Europe with active nu-
11 clear power programs, and—

12 (A) an analysis of each country's nuclear
13 energy policy;

14 (B) an overview of existing areas of co-
15 operation with regards to nuclear energy be-
16 tween each country and—

17 (i) the United States;

18 (ii) other European and friendly coun-
19 tries; and

20 (iii) adversarial countries including
21 China and Russia;

22 (C) an overview of potential areas for fu-
23 ture cooperation between each country and the
24 United States with regards to nuclear energy;
25 and

1 (D) a summary of fuel types used in each
2 country's nuclear power programs.

3 (7) An overview of Russian and Chinese influ-
4 ence in the European nuclear energy sector.

5 (8) An overview of how the United States Gov-
6 ernment is working with allies and partners to
7 counter Russian malign influence within the Euro-
8 pean energy sector to include steps taken to counter
9 Russian influence in the mining and milling, conver-
10 sion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication processes as
11 well as in reactor construction.

12 (9) An overview of how the United States Gov-
13 ernment balances the urgent strategic need for col-
14 laboration with allies and partners on countering
15 Russia's influence on nuclear energy in Europe, with
16 commercial competitiveness issues that may arise be-
17 tween United States companies and companies in
18 Europe, Canada, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.

19 (10) An assessment of Rosatom's role in Rus-
20 sia's energy sector, to include an overview of
21 strengths and vulnerabilities of the conglomerate.

22 (c) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 120 days after the
23 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
24 shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees
25 the strategy required by subsection (a).

1 (d) FORM.—The strategy required by subsection (a)
2 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain
3 a classified annex, so long as such annex is provided sepa-
4 rately from the unclassified strategy.

5 **SEC. 5. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**

6 There is authorized to be appropriated \$30,000,000
7 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 to support
8 critically needed engagement in Europe consistent with
9 the strategy required by section 4(a) on countering Rus-
10 sian malign influence and with a particular focus on re-
11 sponsible nuclear power program capacity building, early
12 stage nuclear power project support, and countering Rus-
13 sian disinformation campaigns.

14 **SEC. 6. DEFINITIONS.**

15 In this Act:

16 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
17 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
18 mittees” means—

19 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
20 the House of Representatives;

21 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
22 the Senate;

23 (C) the Committee on Energy and Com-
24 merce of the House of the Representatives; and

1 (D) the Committee on Energy and Natural
2 Resources of the Senate.

3 (2) HIGH ASSAY LOW ENRICHED URANIUM.—

4 The term “high assay low enriched uranium” means
5 uranium enriched so that the concentration of the
6 fissile isotope uranium-235 (U-235) is between 5
7 percent and 20 percent of the mass of uranium.

8 (3) LOW ENRICHED URANIUM.—The term “low
9 enriched uranium” means fuel in which the weight
10 percent of U-235 in the uranium is less than 20 per-
11 cent.

○