

119<sup>TH</sup> CONGRESS  
1<sup>ST</sup> SESSION

# H. R. 1701

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IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 22, 2025

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

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## AN ACT

To require the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State to monitor efforts by the People's Republic of China to build or buy strategic foreign ports, and for other purposes.

1        *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2        *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

1 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

2 This Act may be cited as the “Strategic Ports Re-  
3 porting Act”.

4 **SEC. 2. MAPPING AND STRATEGY REQUIRED.**

5 (a) MAPPING OF GLOBAL PORTS.—The Secretary of  
6 State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense,  
7 shall—

8 (1) develop an updated, global mapping of for-  
9 eign and domestic ports identified to be of impor-  
10 tance to the United States, because of a capability  
11 to provide military, diplomatic, economic, or resource  
12 exploration superiority; and

13 (2) identify any efforts by the Government of  
14 the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or other PRC  
15 entities to build, buy, or otherwise control, directly  
16 or indirectly, such ports.

17 (b) SUBMISSION OF MAP.—The Secretary of State,  
18 in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit  
19 the mapping developed pursuant to subsection (a) to the  
20 appropriate congressional committees. Such submission  
21 shall be in unclassified form, but may include a classified  
22 annex.

1 **SEC. 3. DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND DEPARTMENT OF DE-**  
2 **FENSE STUDY AND REPORT ON STRATEGIC**  
3 **PORTS.**

4 (a) **STUDY REQUIRED.**—The Secretary of State, in  
5 coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall conduct  
6 a study of—

7 (1) strategic ports;

8 (2) the reasons such ports are of interest to the  
9 United States;

10 (3) the activities and plans of the Government  
11 of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to expand  
12 its control over strategic ports outside of the Peo-  
13 ple’s Republic of China;

14 (4) the public and private actors, such as China  
15 Ocean Shipping Company, that are executing and  
16 supporting the activities and plans of the Govern-  
17 ment of the PRC to expand its control over strategic  
18 ports outside of the PRC;

19 (5) the activities and plans of the Government  
20 of the PRC to expand its control over maritime lo-  
21 gistics by promoting products, such as LOGINK,  
22 and setting industry standards outside the PRC;

23 (6) how the control by the Government of the  
24 PRC over strategic ports outside of the PRC could  
25 harm the national security or economic interests of

1 the United States and allies and partners of the  
2 United States; and

3 (7) measures the United States Government  
4 could take to ensure open access and security for  
5 strategic ports and offer alternatives to PRC invest-  
6 ments or stakes in strategic ports.

7 (b) CONDUCT OF STUDY.—The Secretary of State  
8 and the Secretary of Defense may enter into an arrange-  
9 ment with a federally funded research and development  
10 center under which the center shall conduct the study re-  
11 quired under subsection (a).

12 (c) REPORT.—

13 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year  
14 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-  
15 retary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of  
16 Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congress-  
17 sional committees a report on the findings of the  
18 study conducted under subsection (a).

19 (2) ELEMENTS.—The report required by para-  
20 graph (1) shall include—

21 (A) a detailed list of all known strategic  
22 ports operated, controlled, or owned, directly or  
23 indirectly, by the PRC or by a foreign person  
24 of the PRC, and an assessment of the national

1 security and economic interests relevant to each  
2 such port;

3 (B) a detailed list of all known strategic  
4 ports operated, controlled, or owned, directly or  
5 indirectly, by the United States or United  
6 States persons and an assessment of the na-  
7 tional security and economic interests relevant  
8 to each such port;

9 (C) an assessment of vulnerabilities of—

10 (i) ports operated, controlled, or  
11 owned, directly or indirectly, by the United  
12 States; and

13 (ii) strategic ports;

14 (D) an analysis of the activities and ac-  
15 tions of the Government of the PRC to gain  
16 control or ownership over strategic ports, in-  
17 cluding promoting products, such as LOGINK,  
18 and setting industry standards;

19 (E) an assessment of how the Government  
20 of the PRC plans to expand its control over  
21 strategic ports outside of the PRC;

22 (F) a suggested strategy, developed in con-  
23 sultation with the heads of the relevant United  
24 States Government offices, that suggests  
25 courses of action to secure trusted investment

1 and ownership of strategic ports and maritime  
2 infrastructure, protect such ports and infra-  
3 structure from PRC control, and ensure open  
4 access and security for such ports, that in-  
5 cludes—

6 (i) a list of relevant existing authori-  
7 ties that can be used to carry out the  
8 strategy;

9 (ii) a list of any additional authorities  
10 necessary to carry out the strategy;

11 (iii) an assessment of products owned  
12 by the Government of the PRC or by an  
13 entity headquartered in the PRC that are  
14 used in connection with strategic ports or  
15 maritime infrastructure;

16 (iv) an assessment of the costs to—

17 (I) secure such trusted invest-  
18 ment and ownership;

19 (II) replace products owned by  
20 the Government of the PRC or an en-  
21 tity headquartered in the PRC that  
22 are used in connection with such  
23 ports; and

1 (III) enhance transparency  
2 around the negative impacts of PRC  
3 control over strategic ports; and

4 (v) a list of funding sources to secure  
5 trusted investment and ownership of stra-  
6 tegic ports, which shall include—

7 (I) an identification of private  
8 funding sources; and

9 (II) an identification of public  
10 funding sources, including loans, loan  
11 guarantees, and tax incentives; and

12 (G) a suggested strategy for Federal agen-  
13 cies to maintain an up-to-date list of strategic  
14 ports.

15 (H) an assessment of any national security  
16 threat posed by such investments or activities to  
17 United States diplomatic and defense personnel  
18 and facilities in the vicinity of such ports, in-  
19 cluding through cyber threats, electronically en-  
20 abled espionage, or other means.

21 (3) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required by  
22 paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified  
23 form, but may include a classified annex.

24 **SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.**

25 In this Act:

1           (1) The term “appropriate congressional com-  
2       mittees” means—

3           (A) the Committee on Transportation and  
4       Infrastructure, the Committee on Energy and  
5       Commerce, the Committee on Armed Services,  
6       the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Per-  
7       manent Select Committee on Intelligence of the  
8       House of Representatives; and

9           (B) the Committee on Commerce, Science,  
10      and Transportation, the Committee on Armed  
11      Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations,  
12      and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the  
13      Senate.

14          (2) The term “relevant United States Govern-  
15      ment offices” means—

16           (A) the Unified Combatant Commands;

17           (B) the Office of the Secretary of Defense;

18           (C) the Office of the Secretary of State;

19           (D) the United States International Devel-  
20      opment Finance Corporation;

21           (E) the Office of the Director of National  
22      Intelligence; and

23           (F) the Maritime Administration of the  
24      Department of Transportation.

1           (3) The term “strategic port” means an inter-  
2           national port or waterway that the heads of the rel-  
3           evant United States Government offices determine is  
4           critical to the national security or economic pros-  
5           perity of the United States.

          Passed the House of Representatives May 22 (legis-  
lative day May 21), 2025.

Attest:                   KEVIN F. MCCUMBER,  
*Clerk.*